In this issue
- Interrogation
- Vehicle searches
- Questioning represented suspects
- Sixth Amendment suppression rules
- "Reach in " searches of parolees
- Armed standoffs
- Disclosing exonerating information
- Miranda’s "rescue" exception

SUMMER 2009
This edition of Point of View is dedicated to the memory of
Sergeant Mark Dunakin
Sergeant Ervin Romans
Sergeant Daniel Sakai
Officer John Hege
of the Oakland Police Department
who were killed in the line of duty
on March 21, 2009

Contents

ARTICLE
1 Interrogation
While officers have lots of discretion in how they interrogate suspects, there are certain restrictions which we examine in this article.

RECENT CASES
21 Arizona v. Gant
The Supreme Court severely restricts the rules on vehicle searches incident to arrest.

23 Montejo v. Louisiana
The Supreme Court severely loosens up the rules on questioning charged suspects who are represented by counsel.

25 Kansas v. Ventris
The consequences of Sixth Amendment violations

26 People v. Smith
“Reach in” searches of parolees

27 Fisher v. City of San Jose
The Ninth Circuit en banc overturns a panel’s decision that limited the discretion of officers during armed standoffs.

29 Tennison v. City of San Francisco
The officers’ duty to disclose exonerating information

30 People v. Richard Allen Davis
The California Supreme Court rules that officers did not violate Miranda when they interrogated the killer of Polly Klass.

FEATURES
33 The Changing Times
35 War Stories
Interrogation

“Neither the body nor mind of an accused may be twisted until he breaks.”

The critical juncture in many criminal investigations is the moment when officers sit down with the suspect in a police interview room or question him in the field. As the Supreme Court pointed out, confessions elicited in the course of police questioning “often seal a suspect’s fate.”

Although it doesn’t happen often, officers will sometimes encounter a suspect who actually wants to provide a complete and truthful statement. This typically occurs when the suspect’s crime was atrocious because, as an esteemed commentator noted, “The nervous pressure of guilt is enormous; the load of the deed done is heavy; the fear of detection fills the consciousness; and when detection comes, the pressure is relieved; and the deep sense of relief makes confession a satisfaction.”

The run-of-the-mill criminal, however, is not so accommodating. In fact, most perpetrators tend to deny everything or admit only what is irrefutable. To get the truth from these people, officers must turn up the heat or, in the words of the United States Supreme Court, “unbend their reluctance.”

Such a question would have seemed zany to the folks who lived in the Middle Ages, a time when suspects who would not confess were simply tortured until they did. Even in the modern era, until around the middle of the 20th Century, officers in some parts of the country employed brutal “third degree” tactics which included “beatings and physical abuse and the brainwashing that comes from repeated suggestion and prolonged interrogation.”

The success rate of these interrogations was remarkably high, although some of the people who confessed were, unfortunately, innocent.

But that’s history. Today, because of the professionalism of law enforcement and the distaste with which Americans view these types of tactics, allegations that officers tormented or physically abused suspects are rare, almost unheard of.

Nevertheless, there is concern that suspects may be subjected to subtle forms of psychological coercion which, although not as repellent as the physical variety, are also capable of breaking a person. As the Supreme Court noted in Blackburn v. Alabama, “The efficiency of the rack and the thumbscrew can be matched, given the proper subject, by more sophisticated modes of persuasion.”

The courts do not, however, prohibit interrogation methods just because they are “sophisticated.” In fact, they don’t even object to psychological pressure. Instead, the only thing they insist upon, apart from Miranda compliance, is that the suspect must have given his statement voluntarily. The question, then, is what must officers do to satisfy this requirement? That’s the subject of this article.

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6 See People v. Andersen (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 563, 574 “[W]hen sufficient pressures are applied, most persons will confess, even to events that are untrue.”
7 (1960) 361 U.S. 199, 206. Edited. ALSO SEE Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157, 164 [investigators “have turned to more subtle forms of psychological pressure”]; Jackson v. Denno (1964) 378 U.S. 368, 389 [officers have turned “to more refined and subtle methods of overcoming a defendant’s will.”].
8 See Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298, 305 [officers may apply “moral and psychological pressures to confess”]; Oregon v. Mathiason (1997) 429 U.S. 492, 495 [“Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime.”]; People v. Andersen (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 563, 575 [“When a person under questioning would prefer not to answer, almost all interrogation involves some degree of pressure.”].
What is “Voluntariness?”

To understand the nature of voluntariness, it is unnecessary to dwell on the various legal definitions of the term because they are all pretty useless. For instance, it has been said that a confession is voluntary if it was the product of a “rational intellect and a free will,” or if it resulted from an “essentially free and unconstrained choice,” or if it was “entirely self-motivated.”

Definitions such as these are not only vague, they are misleading. If criminals could give usable confessions only if they truly wanted to confess, and only if their minds were rational and unburdened, an officer would be lucky to obtain one or two admissible confessions in his entire career.

Instead, to understand the nature of voluntariness, it is more helpful to examine its antithesis—involuntariness. Here, the rules are fairly clear: A statement is involuntary if all of the following circumstances existed:

1. **Coercion:** The suspect was subjected to coercive interrogation tactics.
2. **Inability to resist:** Because of the suspect’s mental or physical condition, he was unable to resist the coercion.
3. **Causation:** The coercion was the dominant motivating factor in the suspect’s decision to make the statement.

Before we examine these circumstances, three things should be noted. First, although involuntary statements are suppressed because they are inherently unreliable, the use of coercion is also objectionable because of its affect on the criminal justice system and the officers themselves. In the words of the Supreme Court, coercion “brutalizes the police, hardens the police, hardens the prisoner against society, and lowers the esteem in which the administration of justice is held by the public.”

Second, statements obtained by means of physical coercion will be suppressed even if the suspect was able to resist and the abuse was not the motivating factor. “When [physical violence] is present,” said the Court, “there is no need to weigh or measure its effects on the will of the individual.”

Third, in determining whether a statement was voluntary, the courts will consider all of the relevant circumstances surrounding the interrogation. This is significant because it means that voluntariness “does not turn on any one fact, no matter how apparently significant.”

What is Coercion?

It might be argued that all police interrogation is coercive if the suspect was guilty because his mind is in turmoil. Among other things, he must invent a plausible “innocent” story, then constantly revise it as he becomes aware of contrary physical evidence and statements from victims, witnesses, or accomplices. Furthermore, when each question is asked, he must mentally review his previous answers to avoid being inconsistent. And because his story is composed of assorted lies, he must be able to quickly invent new ones when they are exposed. That’s real pressure. But it’s not the kind of pressure that troubles the courts.

Instead, their concern is whether the officers’ words or actions generated the kind of stress that compelled the suspect to confess or make damaging statements.
admissions. As the United States Supreme Court pointed out, “[C]oercion can be mental as well as physical, and the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition.”

It is important to understand that, while psychological coercion is prohibited, officers are free to apply “moral and psychological pressure.” It must be acknowledged, however, that the line between psychological pressure and psychological coercion can be difficult to detect. Taking note of this, the Supreme Court said in Haley v. Ohio, “Unfortunately, we have neither physical nor intellectual weights and measures by which judicial judgment can determine when pressures in securing a confession reach the coercive intensity that calls for exclusion of a statement so secured.”

To compound the problem, an officer’s decisions on how to interrogate a suspect must be made under circumstances that seldom allow for calm and deliberate judgment. Instead, they must respond quickly to the suspect’s words, his changing moods, and various ploys. Moreover, they may need to deal with their own anger and frustration caused by an “excess of zeal or aggressive impatience or flaring up of temper in the face of obstinate silence.”

To make matters worse, officers know they will not get a statement if they do not press; but if they press too much, any statement they get will be suppressed. With this dilemma in mind, the Court of Appeal aptly noted that officers who are interviewing a suspect “must skate a fine line.”

Finally, the question arises: Doesn’t the officers’ compliance with Miranda’s warning and waiver procedure provide sufficient assurance that confessions and admissions are voluntary? After all, every suspect who is Mirandized is fully aware that he does not have to talk to the officers, and that he can stop the interview whenever he wants.

The answer is that Miranda compliance does reduce the level of psychological compulsion. In fact, the Supreme Court has noted that “cases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.”

But the courts continue to enforce the rule against psychological coercion because a suspect who waives his rights at the beginning of an interview may later, as the result of a sudden or gradual buildup of coercion, be unable to resist and assert his rights.

What, then, are the circumstances that indicate an interview was or was not coercive? In addition to threats and promises (which are covered in the next section), the following are especially important:

The officers’ attitude

When judges are reading a transcript of an interview or watching a video recording of one, the first thing that jumps out is the prevailing tone of the interview, especially the officers’ demeanor. For example, in rejecting claims of coercion, the courts have noted the following:

18 Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298, 305. Emphasis added. NOTE: In the past, courts would sometimes rule that a statement was coerced if it resulted from any pressure whatsoever—no matter how slight. But because the courts now appreciate the difference between pressure and coercion, and because they must now consider the totality of circumstances, the “slightest pressure” test has been abolished. See Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 285 [“[I]t is clear that [the ‘slightest pressure’ language] does not state the standard for determining the voluntariness of a confession”]; People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 986, fn.10 [the “slightest pressure” test is contrary to [Fulminante]].
21 People v. Andersen (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 563, 576. ALSO SEE Haynes v. Washington (1963) 373 U.S. 503, 515 [“The line between proper and permissible police conduct and techniques and methods offensive to due process is, at best, a difficult one to draw.”].
22 Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 433, fn.20. ALSO SEE United States v. Washington (1977) 431 U.S. 181, 188 [“[I]t seems self-evident that one who is told he is free to refuse to answer questions is in a curious posture to later complain that his answers were compelled.”]; Missouri v. Seibert (2004) 542 U.S. 600, 608-09 [“[G]iving the [Miranda] warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility.”].
23 See Dickerson v. United States (2000) 530 U.S. 428, 444 [Miranda “does not, of course, dispense with the voluntariness inquiry.”].
“[The officers] posed their questions in a calm, deliberate manner,” their voices were “very quiet and subdued.”

“Everything totally aboveboard with the officers. No coercion, no harassment. No heavy-handedness. [They] were patient and even-handed.”

“[The officers’] manner of presentation of evidence compared favorably with the presentation of evidence by well-behaved lawyers in court. Neither in tone nor tempo nor decibel does coercive pressure appear.”

This does not mean that officers must be friendly or dispassionate. On the contrary, the courts have consistently rejected arguments that psychological coercion resulted merely because the officers were persistent, or because the suspect was subjected to “intellectual persuasion” or “searching questions,” or because he was confronted with “contradictory facts,” or because the interview included “loud, aggressive accusations of lying,” “harsh questioning,” or “tough talk.”

**Interrogation tactics**

In the course of an interview, officers will often employ basic or improvised interrogation tactics. While this may give them a psychological advantage, it is not deemed coercive because, as the California Supreme Court observed, “Although adversarial balance, or rough equality, may be the norm that dictates trial procedures, it has never been the norm that dictates the rules of investigation and the gathering of proof.” To put it another way, “There is no constitutional right to a clumsy or inexperienced questioner.” But, as we will discuss later, the courts have suppressed statements resulting from extreme tactics, especially when they were used against vulnerable suspects.

**Sympathy:** An officer’s sympathetic attitude toward a suspect will not render a statement involuntary because an understanding manner, even when feigned, is not coercive. Thus, the U.S. Court of Appeal noted in *Miller v. Fenton* that the “good guy” approach “is recognized as a permissible interrogation tactic” and that “a sympathetic attitude on the part of the interrogator is not in itself enough to render a confession involuntary.” Or, in the words of the Fifth Circuit, “[T]here is nothing inherently wrong with efforts to create a favorable climate for confession.”

**“GOOD COP—BAD COP”**

The ever-popular “good cop-bad cop” routine is not considered coercive unless the “bad” cop gets carried away; e.g., threatens to arrest the suspect’s grandmother.

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26 *People v. Benson* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 780 [edited quote from trial judge].
29 See *People v. Ditson* (1962) 57 Cal.2d 415, 433.
30 See *People v. Ditson* (1962) 57 Cal.2d 415, 433.
32 *See In re Joe R.* (1980) 27 Cal.3d 496, 515; *U.S. v. Braxton* (4th Cir. 1997) 112 F.3d 777, 782 [officers accused the suspect of “not coming clean”]; *Jenner v. Smith* (8th Cir. 1993) 982 F.2d 329, 334 (“It was likewise permissible to elicit further statements by claiming not to believe her denials.”).
33 See *Jenner v. Smith* (8th Cir. 1993) 982 F.2d 329, 334 [“raised voice” not coercive].
38 See *People v. Jablonski* (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 815 [court rejects “excessive friendliness” argument]; *People v. Bradford* (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1043 (“Nor would we conclude that [the officer’s] efforts to establish a rapport with defendant constitute coercion.”); *Jenner v. Smith* (8th Cir. 1993) 982 F.2d 329, 334 [“Numerous cases have held that questioning tactics such as… a sympathetic attitude on the part of the interrogator will not render a confession involuntary unless the overall impact of the interrogation caused the defendant’s will to be overborne.”]; *Hawkins v. Lynaugh* (5th Cir. 1988) 844 F.2d 1132, 1139-40.
40 *Hawkins v. Lynaugh* (5th Cir. 1988) 844 F.2d 1132, 1140.
41 See *Martin v. Wainwright* (11th Cir. 1995) 770 F.2d 918, 925 [“bad” cop “discussed the death penalty”].
LIES AND DECEPTION: A statement will not be deemed involuntary merely because the officers lied to the suspect about the existence of incriminating evidence, or if they exaggerated the quality or quantity of their evidence. While lies such as these might motivate some suspects to respond by confessing or making an incriminating statement, the courts have consistently rejected arguments that such tactics were inherently coercive. The following are examples of lies that were not problematic:

- We arrested your accomplice and he confessed.
- The victim ID’d you.
- We located a witness who ID’d you.
- We found your fingerprints on the victim’s neck, on the victim’s wallet, on the victim’s cash register, in the victim’s home, in the getaway car, at the scene of the crime.
- We tested soil samples under your car and they matched the dirt at the crime scene.
- You flunked your lie detector test, DNA test, gunshot residue test.
- We know a lot more than we’re telling you.
- Richmond detectives gave a murder suspect a “Neutron Proton Negligence Intelligence Test” (actually, they just dabbed his hand with a drug-test solution that naturally changed color), and said it proved he had recently fired a gun.

The courts have also ruled that a suspect’s statement was not involuntary merely because the officers did not reveal the real reason they wanted to question him, or because they denied they were conducting a criminal investigation, or because they told a wounded suspect that he’d better give a statement now because, in their medical opinion, he might die before reaching the hospital.

It must be noted, however, that there is some authority for suppressing statements if, (1) the officers employed a type of deception that was reasonably likely to “procure an untrue statement”; and (2) the suspect’s mind was so disordered that he was unusually susceptible to the influences of others, in which case his lack of confidence in his mind’s ability to apprehend reality might cause him to accept the officers’ repeated lies as the truth. Thus, Court of Appeal explained that “[t]he limits on the use of subterfuge in interrogation are defined by the potentiality of the subterfuge to produce an untrue statement.”

In the most cited case, People v. Hogan, the court ruled that the confession of a rape-murder suspect was involuntary mainly because, (1) he was “sobbing uncontrollably” and was so emotionally distraught that he had vomited, (2) the officers repeatedly suggested to him that he was unquestionably

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42 See Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292, 297 (“mere strategic deception” is not coercive); Amaya-Ruíz v. Stewart (9th Cir. 1997) 121 F.3d 486, 495 (“Misrepresentations linking a suspect to a crime or statements which inflate the extent of the evidence against a suspect do not necessarily render a confession involuntary.”); People v. Chutan (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1280 (“Police officers are at liberty to utilize deceptive stratagems to trick a guilty person into confessing.”); People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 167 (“Numerous California decisions confirm that deception does not necessarily invalidate a confession.”).
45 Ledbetter v. Edwards (6th Cir. 1994) 35 F.3d 1062, 1066.
48 People v. Connelly (1925) 195 Cal. 584, 597.
49 Lucero v. Kerby (10th Cir. 1998) 133 F.3d 1299, 1311.
60 In re Walker (1974) 10 Cal.3d 764, 775, 777.
63 (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815.
guilty and mentally ill, and (3) the certainty of his guilt “was suggested by deceptive references to nonexistence eyewitnesses and proof of rape.”

**Exploiting a Suspect’s Vulnerabilities:** The courts have often expressed their disapproval of obtaining statements by exploiting a suspect’s deep-seated psychological vulnerabilities. For example, capitalizing on a suspect’s profound religious beliefs or fears has been criticized because, as one court said, “Religious beliefs are not matters to be used by government authorities to manipulate a suspect to say things he or she otherwise would not say.”

**Confronting with Evidence:** Officers may, of course, confront a suspect with all of the evidence that proves or tends to prove he is guilty. “[G]ood faith confrontation,” said the Court of Appeal, “is an interrogation technique possessing no apparent constitutional vices.”

**Withholding Information:** A statement is not involuntary merely because officers withheld information that might have made the suspect less apt to confess; e.g., witnesses were unable to ID him in a physical or photo lineup.

**Accuse of Lying:** Officers may urge the suspect to stop lying and tell the truth, and they may employ any of the variations on this theme such as, “get the burden off your conscience,” or “you’ll feel better if you tell the truth.” As the California Supreme Court explained, “[M]ere advice or exhortation by the police that it would be better for the accused to tell the truth when unaccompanied by either a threat or a promise does not render a subsequent confession involuntary.” In one such case, *People v. Andersen*, the court explained, “Because defendant had been recounting demonstrable falsehoods to the police in her earlier interviews, the admonition to tell the truth was appropriate and timely and not one extraneously dragged in as a club with which to bully the suspect.”

**Posit Theories:** It is not inherently coercive for officers to tell the suspect about their theories as to how the crime occurred, even if some of their theories would result in a longer prison sentence than others.

**Leading Questions:** A question is “leading” if it suggested a certain answer, usually the answer the officers wanted to hear; e.g., “You were the one who planned the holdup, weren’t you?” (leading); “Who planned the holdup?” (not leading). Although it is relevant that the suspect made his statement in response to an officer’s leading question, it is not a significant circumstance.

**Going “Outside Miranda”:** Going “outside Miranda” was a tactic in which officers would ignore a suspect’s invocation of his Miranda rights so that they might obtain a statement that prosecutors could use to impeach him at trial if he testified. Although some courts have given mixed signals on the use of this tactic, and have even held that such statements were admissible when there were ex-

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64 *People v. Adams* (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 970, 989. ALSO SEE *People v. Kelly* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 931, 953 (“[T]he tactic of exploiting a suspect’s religious anxieties has been justly condemned”); *People v. Montano* (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 914, 935 (“[The officer] aggravated the situation by using their common religion to conjure up in defendant’s mind the picture of confessing to avoid going to hell”); *Brewer v. Williams* (1977) 430 U.S. 387, 402-3 [suspect was “deeply religious and an escapee from a mental hospital”]; *U.S. v. Tingle* (9th Cir. 1981) 658 F.2d 1332, 1336 [officers “exert improper influence” when they “prey upon maternal instinct and inculcate fear in a mother that she will not see her child”]. COMPARE *People v. Maestas* (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1499, 1506 (“Such references to religion and appellant’s Catholic beliefs were brief and suggestive that appellant tell the truth.”).


66 See *Colorado v. Spring* (1987) 479 U.S. 564, 577 [withholding information about the nature of the crime under investigation “could affect only the wisdom of a Miranda waiver, not its essentially voluntary and knowing nature.”]; *People v. Boyette* (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 411 (“Defendant does not explain how the voluntariness of his confession required police to disclose they were focusing on him as a suspect.”); *U.S. v. D’Antoni* (7th Cir. 1988) 856 F.2d 975, 981 (“Merely withholding information regarding the subject of the interrogation does not render a Miranda waiver involuntary”).

67 See *People v. Andersen* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 563, 578; *People v. Amaya-Ruiz* (9th Cir. 1997) 121 F.3d 486, 494 (“Encouraging Amaya-Ruiz to tell the truth also did not amount to coercion.”); *U.S. v. Ballard* (5th Cir. 1978) 586 F.2d 1060, 1063.


70 See *People v. Thompson* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 170.

71 See *People v. Cox* (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 980, 986 (“The fact that the questions were somewhat leading does not equate to a conclusion that they were coercive.”); *Spaso v. New York* (1959) 360 U.S. 315, 322 (“leading questions of a skillful prosecutor”).
The surrounding circumstances

While voluntariness depends largely on the officers’ words and conduct, many of the miscellaneous circumstances surrounding the interview may also be relevant.

LOCATION OF THE INTERVIEW: Many suspects are questioned in police interrogation rooms which are considered inherently coercive because they are usually small, stark, and located within the confines of heavily-secured government buildings. Nevertheless, this is seldom a significant circumstance if the suspect had waived his Miranda rights.

NUMBER OF OFFICERS: The courts often note the number of officers who were present, especially the number of officers who participated in the questioning. For example, in one case the Supreme Court noted that the “tiny” interrogation room was “literally filled with police officers.”

MIRANDA WAIVER: Although it is relevant that the suspect was informed of his Miranda rights and waived them, a waiver will not save a statement in the face of outright coercion. Said the Court of Appeal, “It cannot be seriously argued that such advice immunizes law enforcement officers from the legal effect of later coercive practices.”

SUSPECT ACKNOWLEDGES VOLUNTARINESS: When a suspect gives statement, officers will often ask him to acknowledge in writing or on tape that he was not pressured or coerced. This is good practice. For example, in rejecting a murder defendant’s argument that officers had threatened him with the death penalty, the California Supreme Court noted among other things, “The transcript of the second tape-recorded statement supports the officers’ testimony. Defendant indicates therein that [the officers] had not coerced him into making a second statement; that he had not been threatened or promised anything.”

Like Miranda waivers, however, such an acknowledgment will have little or no weight with the courts if it appears the acknowledgment itself was coerced, or if there were other circumstances that cast doubt on the voluntariness of the suspect’s statement.

72 See, for example, People v. Depriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 35 [court rejects the argument that “continued interrogation” after suspect invoked “compels a finding of official coercion”; People v. Coffman (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 58 [“That [the officer] repeatedly ignored Marlow’s requests for an attorney does give rise to concern, but—given Marlow’s maturity and criminal experience—it was unlikely Marlow’s will was thereby overborne.”]; People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 30 [“[T]he deliberateness of a [Miranda] violation did not alter the balance struck in Harris and other cases between deterring police misconduct and exposing defendants who commit perjury at trial.”].

73 See Cooper v. Dupnik (9th Cir. 1992) 963 F.2d 1220, 1243 [“With his requests to see a lawyer disregarded, Cooper was a prisoner in a totalitarian nightmare, where the police no longer obeyed the Constitution, but instead following their own judgment, treating suspects according to their whims.”]; People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 81-82 [that the officer “intentionally continued interrogation in deliberate violation of Miranda” “weighs most heavily against the voluntariness”]; People v. Montano (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 914, 932-37; People v. Hinds (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 222, 238-39; Gavin v. Farmon (9th Cir. 2001) 258 F.3d 951, 954.


75 See Blackburn v. Alabama (1960) 361 U.S. 199, 204 [“M]ost of the interrogation took place in closely confined quarters—a room about four by six or six by eight feet”]; Green v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 126, 131 [“The [interview] rooms 7 by 12 feet, have no windows and require a key to enter or exit.”].

76 Blackburn v. Alabama (1960) 361 U.S. 199, 207. ALSO SEE Spano v. New York (1959) 360 U.S. 315, 207 [suspect “was subjected to questioning not by a few men but [12 officers and two deputy DAs].”]. COMPARE U.S. v. Ross (7th Cir. 2007) 510 F.3d 702, 710 [“Although several armed inspectors were moving around his apartment at the time of his confession, only two inspectors interviewed him at any given time.”].

77 People v. Clark (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 87, 91.


79 See Haley v. Ohio (1947) 332 U.S. 598, 601 [“Formulas of respect for constitutional safeguards cannot prevail over the facts of life which contradict them.”]; People v. Rand (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 668, 674 [the defendant’s acknowledgment that his statement was given voluntarily “does not detract from the conclusion that such statement was involuntarily made.”]
Threats and Promises

One of the most coercive things an officer can do during an interview is threaten to take some adverse action against the suspect if he refuses to give a statement. It is also considered coercive to promise something in return for a statement—especially something the suspect wants desperately, such as his freedom or a light sentence. As the California Supreme Court observed, “Promises and threats traditionally have been recognized as corrosive of voluntariness.”

Before going further, three things should be noted. First, there is no significant difference between threats and promises. For example, a promise that a suspect will receive a lenient sentence if he gives a statement is essentially an implied threat that he will serve more time if he refuses. Second, an implied threat or promise may be just as coercive as an explicit one. Third, although the courts sometimes say that “false” or “broken” promises are prohibited, a statement motivated by a promise will ordinarily be deemed involuntary, regardless of whether the promise was kept.

Threats pertaining to sentencing

When officers are questioning a suspect who thinks he is toast, there is probably only one thing on his mind: reducing the amount of time he will spend in jail or prison. Consequently, the subject of sentencing is likely to arise, whether it is introduced by the suspect (who is looking for a deal) or by officers (who are looking for a confession). The question, then, is what are the do’s and don’ts?

For one thing, officers should make it clear that they cannot promise anything—that decisions on charging and sentencing are made by prosecutors and judges. Furthermore, they must not threaten or promise the suspect that he will receive a particular or lesser sentence if he gives a statement. As the California Supreme Court explained:

[If the suspect] is given to understand that he might reasonably expect benefits in the nature of more lenient treatment at the hands of the police, prosecution or court in consideration of making a statement, even a truthful one, such motivation is deemed to render the statement involuntary and inadmissible.

This does not mean that the subjects of sentencing and charging are off limits. It just means that officers must make sure that their comments about charging and sentencing are factual, which necessarily means noncommittal. “The critical question,” said the court in People v. Cahill, “is when does a representation in the course of an interrogation about penal consequences of silence or untruthfulness amount to a threat or promise?”

For example, in ruling that an officer’s comments pertaining to charging or sentencing were coercive, the courts have pointed out the following:

- “The clear implication of the officer’s remarks was that unless defendant changed her story and confessed her true involvement in the crime, she would be tried for murder.”
- “[The officer implied] that defendant would be tried for first degree murder unless he admitted that he was inside the house and denied that he had premeditated the killing.”

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81 See People v. Hill (1967) 66 Cal.2d 536, 549 [“The offer or promise of such benefit need not be expressed, but may be implied from equivocal language”]; People v. Flores (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 459, 471 [“Implicit in this remark is the inference, ‘the carrot,’ that appellant would be treated differently, more leniently as a reward for his admission or confession.”].

82 See People v. Vasila (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 865, 875 [“The Attorney General urges us to conclude that officers are permitted to induce a confession by making promises, so long as they keep them. This is not the law.” Edited]; People v. Dominick (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 1174, 1192 [“Whether or not the detective’s statement was false does not in any way change the actuality of the defendant’s state of mind with respect to voluntariness.”].

83 See People v. Groody (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 355, 359 [“[The detective] expressly informed appellant that he could make no guarantees of leniency.”]; People v. Boyle (1988) 46 Cal.3d 212, 239 [“[The detective] repeatedly and clearly stated that he had no authority to make any promise of leniency . . . but could only pass information on to the district attorney.”].

84 People v. Hill (1967) 66 Cal.2d 536, 549.


86 People v. McClary (1977) 20 Cal.3d 218, 223.

“[T]he officers implied that appellant was more likely to be sent to San Quentin if he failed to provide the police with a confession.”

“They told him his only way out was to say [the shooting] was an accident. They implied by so saying he would not have to go to prison and would be out with his children.”

“[D]efendant was given bald promises that, if he provided the necessary information, he would not be prosecuted federally and would be released from custody.”

**DISCUSSING POSSIBLE SENTENCES:** Officers may inform suspects of the possible sentences they are facing—the realities of their predicament—if they do so in a nonthreatening and noncoercive manner. Said the Court of Appeal, “[T]ruthful and commonplace statements of possible legal consequences, if unaccompanied by threat or promise, are permissible police practices and will not alone render a subsequent statement involuntary and inadmissible.”

For example, in *People v. Bradford* the interrogating officer responded as follows when a murder suspect asked about his possible sentence: “Well, it can go anywhere from, and this is just my opinion, I’m not telling you what’s going to happen, it can go anywhere from second-degree murder to first-degree murder . . . . If there’s a trail of girls laying from anywhere from second-degree murder to first-degree murder . . . . If there’s a trail of girls laying from here to Colorado, then it doesn’t look too good for you.” In rejecting the defendant’s argument that the officer’s comments rendered his subsequent statement involuntary, the court said, “[W]e believe defendant would reasonably understand these statements to mean that no promises or guarantees were being made.”

**DISCUSSING THE DEATH PENALTY:** While officers may inform a murder suspect that the crime under investigation may carry the death penalty, they may not do so in a threatening manner, nor may they imply that the suspect might avoid the death penalty if he confessed. For example, in *People v. Flores* an officer told the defendant, “Right now the way it looks, it looks like robbery and murder. You know what robbery and murder is? Robbery and murder is a capital offense in California. An offense that you could go to the gas chamber.” In ruling that the defendant’s subsequent statement was involuntary, the court said, “Only by confessing his involvement in the decedent’s death could the appellant avoid the possible death penalty.” Similarly, in *People v. Hinds* the court ruled that the defendant’s confession was involuntary because the officers repeatedly “suggested that if appellant did not explain to them mitigating factors, he might get the death penalty.”

**DISCUSSING MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES:** Officers may point out to the suspect that the punishment for his crime may depend on the role he played in its

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91 *See People v. Daniels* (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 863 [“There is nothing improper in confronting a suspect with the predicament he or she is in”]; *People v. Andersen* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 563, 583 [officers merely “commented on the realities of her position”].
92 *See People v. Cahill* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 296, 311 [“The critical question is: when does a representation in the course of an interrogation about the penal consequences of silence or untruthfulness amount to a threat or promise?”]; *U.S. v. Ballard* (5th Cir. 1978) 586 F.2d 1060, 1063 [“A truthful and noncoercive statement of the possible penalties which an accused faces may be given to the accused without overbearing one’s free will.”]; *U.S. v. Haswood* (9th Cir. 2003) 350 F.3d 1024, 1029 [“Reciting potential penalties or sentences does not constitute coercion.”].
93 *People v. Flores* (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 459, 469. ALSO SEE *People v. Davis* (2009) Cal.4th __ [“Sergeant Meese said nothing beyond the obvious in that defendant’s crimes, involving the kidnap and murder of a child, made him eligible for the death penalty. Meese correctly implied that any evidence of a sexual assault (or lack thereof) would not have altered that circumstance.”].
94 1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1044.
95 *See People v. Ray* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 340 [“[A] confession will not be invalidated simply because the possibility of a death sentence was discussed beforehand.”]; *People v. Holloway* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 115 [“In telling defendant that ‘we’re talking about a death penalty case here, Detective Hash said nothing beyond the obvious, for the crime—the murder of two young women, in their home, with signs of sexual assault— was a clear candidate for capital prosecution.”].
96 *See People v. Nicholas* (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 249, 265 [Officer: “Death penalty went back in today. Did you know that?”]; *People v. McClary* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 218, 229 [officers “advised her that unless she changed her statement and admitted the true extent of her complicity, she would . . . face the death penalty.”]; *People v. Williams* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 659 [“[If you assist us in this investigation, you won’t get the death penalty]”.
commission and his state of mind at the time. Although there is an implication that the suspect might be better off if he confessed and explained any mitigating circumstances, such an appeal is not considered objectionable so long as the officers did not promise anything specific.99

For example, in People v. Garcia the defendant drove the getaway car that his accomplice, Orlando, used in committing a robbery-murder in Oxnard. After arresting Garcia, an officer told him, “If you guys were doing a robbery, he shot the guy, he panicked or whatever, that’s the price he’s going to have to pay. We’re going to focus our thing on him—Orlando. But there’s no sense you going down the way he is, that far down with him as a trigger man.” In ruling that the officer’s words did not constitute a promise, the California Supreme Court explained that the officer was merely pointing out that “an accomplice is generally better off than a triggerman,” adding, “That was sound advice.”100

In People v. Hill the officers who were questioning another getaway car driver “urged him to consider his own position and, in effect, to desert a sinking ship and grab a lifesaver if he could, as he might expect his codefendants to do.” These comments were entirely proper because, as the court explained, the officers merely “pointed out those benefits which would naturally accrue to him if his true role in the crime was made known, but such benefits did not include leniency or favorable treatment by the state.”101

In another case, People v. Andersen,102 a detective explained to a murder suspect that homicide is broken into degrees “ranging from plot-and-scheme to heat-of-passion,” and that if the shooting took place in the heat of an argument she would be “better off explaining her intent to a judge or jury” instead of “persisting in a denial contrary to all the evidence, a denial which makes things go hard. A showing of remorse makes things easier.”

The court had no problem with the detective’s comment that a showing of remorse is a mitigating factor. Said the court, “This statement is no more than a truthful legal commonplace with which all persons familiar with criminal law would agree.” But when the officer added that “a denial makes things go hard,” the court said he was “venturing on thin ice” because he was implying that a judge or jury would look at her “in an unfavorable light if she persisted in a false story.”

Officers may point out to the suspect that his sentence may depend on whether his crime was planned, impulsive, or accidental, as this is also a “truthful legal commonplace.” Thus, in such cases the courts have noted the following:

- The officer suggested that “the killings might have been accidental or resulted from an uncontrollable fit of rage during a drunken blackout, and that such circumstances could make a lot of difference.” These remarks, said the court, “fall far short of being promises of lenient treatment in exchange for cooperation.”103
- “The circumstances of the crime here suggested alternative theories of accidental or intentional killing and, absent evidence refuting one theory, both would likely be asserted. The police did not promise to abandon the theory of intentional killing if defendant confessed.”104

Officers must not, however, threaten the suspect by saying that they, prosecutors, or the judge would presume there were no mitigating circumstances if he refused to make a statement in which he explained his lesser role or less blameworthy state of mind. For example, in People v. McClary105 an officer told a murder suspect, “Your involvement can be less than what we think it is right now. It might be more. I don’t know. You’re the one that’s going to have to say. You can either be a direct participant, or you can be an accessory after the fact. . . . Unless your story changes to where you can say something else

99 See People v. Maestas (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1499, 1507 [“The comments explain the possible consequences, depending upon his motivation and involvement in the shooting, and as such do not constitute threats or false promises of leniency.”].
100 (1984) 36 Cal.3d 539, 546.
104 People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134.
105 (1977) 20 Cal.3d 218.
happened and we can prove you true, then you’re going to be tried [as a principal].” In ruling that this comment constituted coercion, the court noted among other things that the officer had “advised her that unless she changed her statement and admitted the true extent of her complicity, she would be charged as a principal to murder and would face the death penalty.”

**DISCUSSING BENEFITS THAT “FLOW NATURALLY”:** In addition to discussing the kinds of mitigating circumstances that might be considered by prosecutors and judges, officers may point out those benefits that “flow naturally” from being truthful. In the words of the California Supreme Court, “When the benefit pointed out by the police to a suspect is merely that which flows naturally from a truthful and honest course of conduct, we can perceive nothing improper in such police activity.” While there might be an implication that the suspect would receive a reduced sentence or some other consideration if he cooperated, it is not viewed as an implied promise of leniency so long as the officers did not promise or suggest a particular benefit.

Admittedly, it can be difficult to distinguish between discussions of naturally-flowing benefits and implied promises that such benefits would accrue. As the California Supreme Court explained, “The line can be a fine one between urging a suspect to tell the truth by factually outlining the benefits that may flow from confessing, which is permissible, and impliedly promising lenient treatment in exchange for a confession, which is not.”

**“WE’LL TELL THE JUDGE, DA”**: Officers may promise the suspect that, if he gives a truthful statement, they would inform the judge or prosecutors that he was cooperative. But they must not promise or suggest that the judge or prosecutors would do something specific in return. Thus, in cases in which such assurances were given, the courts have noted the following:

- “Because none of the detectives’ statements indicated that the district attorney would act favorably in specific ways if appellant cooperated, they did not constitute impermissible promises of favorable action.”
- “[The detective’s] promise to talk to the district attorney about ‘special consideration’ for appellant, and his statement that one such consideration might be for the district attorney to charge only one burglary, was no more than the pointing out of benefits which might result naturally from a truthful and honest course of conduct.”
- “[The detective] repeatedly and clearly stated that he had no authority to make any promise of leniency regarding the pending robbery-kidnap charges, but could only pass information on to the district attorney.”
- “[The detective] told defendant the district attorney would make no deals unless all of the information defendant claimed to have was first on the table. We conclude no implied promise of a ‘deal’ or leniency resulted from these conversations.”

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106 See *People v. Ray* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 340 (“[I]nvestigating officers are not precluded from discussing any ‘advantage’ or other consequence that will ‘naturally accrue’ in the event the accused speaks truthfully about the crime.”); *Juan H. v. Allen* (9th Cir. 2005) 408 F.3d 1262, 1273 (“It is not enough, even in the case of a juvenile, that the police indicate that a cooperative attitude would be to the benefit of an accused unless such remarks rise to the level of being threatening or coercive.”); *U.S. v. Mashburn* (4th Cir. 2005) 406 F.3d 303, 310 (“[T]he agents simply informed Mashburn of the gravity of his suspected offenses and the benefits of cooperation under the federal system.”).

107 *People v. Holloway* (2005) 33 Cal.4th 96, 117. ALSO SEE *People v. Thompson* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 169 (“The line between a threat (or a promise) and a statement of fact or intention can be a fine one.”).

108 See *People v. Jones* (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 298 (“[T]he detective’s offers of intercession with the district attorney [‘telling the district attorney that defendant had been honest’] amounted to truthful implications that his cooperation might be useful in later plea bargain negotiations.”); *People v. Higareda* (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1409 [statement not involuntary merely because the officer told the suspect “if he spoke the truth I would talk to the District Attorney’’]; *U.S. v. Ballard* (5th Cir. 1978) 586 F.2d 1060, 1063 (“Neither is a statement that the accused’s cooperation will be made known to the court a sufficient inducement so as to render a subsequent incriminating statement involuntary.”).


Note, however, that officers must not tell the suspect that they would notify the judge or DA if he refused to give a statement or failed to demonstrate remorse, as this could be interpreted as a threat.\textsuperscript{114}

\textbf{“Help Yourself”:} While there might be a slight implication that the suspect would receive something in return, the courts have ruled that appeals such as the following were not objectionable because the officers did not promise anything specific: “Why don’t you go and tell us, it will be better off for you and it will help you later on,”\textsuperscript{115} “[I]’ll be in your best interests to tell the truth,”\textsuperscript{116} “[A] cooperative attitude will be to your benefit,”\textsuperscript{117} “Are you gonna help me? That’s all I want and I’ll help you.”\textsuperscript{118}

\textbf{Promise to release from custody}

A statement that is motivated by a promise to immediately release the suspect from custody will ordinarily be deemed involuntary. For example, in \textit{In re J. Clyde K.}, the court ruled that the confession of a minor who had been detained for auto burglary was involuntary because the officer promised him that if he “told the truth” he would be released “with only a citation.”\textsuperscript{119}

\textbf{Threats and promises pertaining to friends}

A threat to take some adverse action against the suspect’s friends or relatives is considered highly coercive. So is a promise that the friend or relative would receive some benefit if the suspect was cooperative.\textsuperscript{120} Thus, in \textit{People v. Matlock} the court noted, “A serious question is presented by the threat of an officer to ‘bring the rest of the family in’ which was expressly made in order to, and did, induce defendant to ‘tell us where the jewelry was.’”\textsuperscript{121}

On the other hand, officers may inform the suspect that he might be able to reduce or eliminate his friend’s legal problems by giving a statement if, (1) the officers reasonably believed that the friend was implicated in the suspect’s criminal activities, and (2) the suspect’s statement might reduce or eliminate the friend’s legal problems.\textsuperscript{122}

For example, in \textit{People v. Abbott} a man named Nichols was arrested for robbing the cashier of a restaurant in Glendale as she was making a night deposit. When officers learned that Nichols and the cashier were roommates, they arrested her for conspiracy. While questioning Nichols, an officer told him that his friend would be released if he was truthful and there was no reason to hold her. Nichols then confessed. In rejecting the argument that the officer’s comment constituted a coercive promise, the court said, “The officers believed that Nichols, and he alone, could implicate [the cashier] or exonerate her. In justice to her it was their duty to learn, if they could, whether her further detention was warranted and this required the interrogation of

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item See U.S. v. Tingle (9th Cir. 1981) 658 F.2d 1332, 1336, fn.5 [court disapproves of “a representation that a defendant’s failure to cooperate will be communicated to a prosecutor”].
\item \textit{People v. Robinson} (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 514, 520. ALSO SEE \textit{People v. Ditson} (1962) 57 Cal.2d 415, 432 [“I’m telling you, Carlos, help yourself.”]; \textit{People v. Spears} (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1, 27 [you’ll “be better off” if you give us “the scoop”]; \textit{People v. Hill} (1967) 66 Cal.2d 536, 549 [Thus, advice or exhortation by a police officer to an accused to “tell the truth” or that “it would be better to tell the truth” unaccompanied by either a threat or a promise, does not render a subsequent confession involuntary.”].
\item See \textit{People v. Seaton} (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 67, 74 [officer said it would be “in his best interests” to provide truthful answers].
\item See \textit{Fare v. Michael C.} (1979) 442 U.S. 707, 727; \textit{Juan H. v. Allen} (9th Cir. 2005) 408 F.3d 1262, 1273.
\item See \textit{People v. Coffman} (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 61, fn.15.
\item See \textit{People v. Steger} (1976) 16 Cal.3d 539, 550 [“A threat by police to arrest or punish a close relative, or a promise to free the relative in exchange for a confession, may render an admission invalid.”]. COMPARE \textit{People v. Chutan} (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1282 [“Nor do we find anything coercive in [the officer’s] statement that ‘what happens here affects your whole family.’”].
\item (1959) 51 Cal.2d 682, 697.
\item See \textit{People v. Howard} (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 398 [“The interrogating officers did not imply that the fate of defendant’s son and of Stevens depended upon defendant stating what they wanted to hear.”]; U.S. v. \textit{McShane} (9th Cir. 1972) 462 F.2d 5, 7 [court distinguished Trout [below] on grounds that, (1) “the police here had grounds to believe that [McShane’s girlfriend] may have been implicated, and (2 the officers did not make explicit threats or promises.”]; \textit{People v. Daniels} (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 863 [“Both had apparently helped defendant escape and hide from the police, and could in fact have been charged as accessories.”] COMPARE \textit{People v. Trout} (1960) 54 Cal.2d 576, 584 [statement involuntary after the suspect’s wife was arrested without probable cause and was used to entice the suspect to make the statement].
\item (1958) 156 Cal.App.2d 601.
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\end{footnotesize}
Nichols. If he felt himself under pressure to make a statement it came from the conditions he had created which placed [the cashier] under suspicion.”

Similarly, in People v. Jackson\textsuperscript{124} the defendant shot and killed a man during a residential burglary in Los Angeles. The next day, an officer in Burbank spotted Jackson and his wife in a car that matched the description of the getaway car. After arresting Jackson, the officer found a gun under the driver’s seat and ammunition inside Ms. Jackson’s purse. So he arrested her, too.

When questioned by an LAPD detective, Jackson said he wanted to make a statement “just to get my wife out of this.” The detective responded, “[A]fter I get through talking to her and comparing what you told me with what she says, if I have reason to feel she’s not involved in it, I’m sure as hell not going to book her.” In ruling that the detective’s words did not constitute an promise, the Court of Appeal noted, “At most there was a simple statement of fact by the officer that defendant’s wife would be released if further investigation convinced him and his superiors that she [was not involved].”

Finally, in People v. Thompson\textsuperscript{125} detectives in Orange County developed probable cause to arrest Thompson for murdering a 12-year old boy. While looking for Thompson, officers saw his girlfriend, Lisa, get into a car and drive off, so they followed her. Lisa apparently spotted the officers because she “drove evasively” and eluded them. Later that day, officers arrested both Thompson and Lisa at a shopping mall. It appears they arrested Lisa because her evasive driving indicated she was involved in the crime, at least as an accessory.

While questioning Thompson, an officer told him that he was “not convinced” of Lisa’s innocence, adding, “[I]nformation hasn’t come forward at this time which would cause me to release her. See what I’m saying?” The court said these comments “seem clearly proper” because the officer had reason to believe that Lisa was implicated. But Thompson did not immediately start talking, so the officer pressed, saying, “I think if you truly loved her, you wouldn’t allow her to sit here in jail if you knew information that would help her.” The officer then referred to Lisa’s “fragile mental condition” and suggested that further incarceration could “really break her.” “Like I told you before,” said the officer, “unless something else comes forward that can show that she’s totally uninvolved. You know what I’m saying?” Thompson confessed several hours later.

Although the court ruled that Thompson’s confession was voluntary (because the coercion was not the motivating cause, see page 17), it pointed out that the officer’s comments came dangerously close to an implied threat because they “could have been understood to convey that defendant’s refusal to confess was responsible for Lisa’s incarceration.”

**Immunity and Plea Agreements**

Although not an “interrogation” issue, an immunity or plea agreement that requires a prosecution witness to admit to certain things or testify to certain facts at the trial of an accomplice is inherently coercive because of the explicit threat that he will not receive the benefits of the agreement if his testimony is inconsistent.\textsuperscript{126} Thus, while immunity agreements may require truthful answers,\textsuperscript{127} they must not bind the witness to a particular story or require that his testimony be consistent with a previous statement. As the court explained in People v. Allen,\textsuperscript{128} “[A] defendant is denied a fair trial if the

\textsuperscript{124} (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 95.
\textsuperscript{125} (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134.
\textsuperscript{126} See People v. Badgett (1995) 10 Cal.4th 330, 358 [“An immunity agreement that requires the witness to testify consistently with a previous statement to the police is deemed coercive, and testimony produced by such an agreement is subject to exclusion from evidence.”]; People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 455 [“But if the immunity agreement places the witness under a strong compulsion to testify in a particular fashion, the testimony is tainted by the witness’s self-interest, and is inadmissible.”]; People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 862 [“We have insisted that the arrangement require the witness to tell the truth, not to present a previously agreed-upon story.”]; People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 417 [“[T]he district attorney’s promise was not conditioned on [the witness] testifying in a particular fashion or on the testimony’s achieving a particular result.”].
\textsuperscript{127} See People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 445 [“There is nothing improperly coercive about confronting a lesser participant in a crime with his or her predicament, and offering immunity from prosecution for the witness's criminal role in return for the witness’s promise to testify fully and fairly.”]; People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1179 [“He was obligated to tell the truth, not to conform his testimony to any prior statement given to the police or anyone else, or otherwise to testify in a particular fashion.”].
\textsuperscript{128} (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1251-52.
prosecution’s case depends substantially on accomplice testimony and the accomplice witness is placed, either by the prosecution or the court, under a strong compulsion to testify in a particular fashion.”

**Suspect’s Ability to Resist**

Until now, we have been discussing the circumstances that the courts consider in determining whether officers obtained a statement by means of psychological coercion. But, as noted earlier, coercion alone will not render a statement involuntary. Instead, that can happen only if the suspect was vulnerable to the coercion that officers utilized. To put it another way, a statement can be involuntary only if the coercive influences outweighed the suspect’s ability to resist them. In the words of the Supreme Court, “The determination [of voluntariness] depends upon a weighing of the circumstances such as his intelligence, education, experience, and ability to comprehend the meaning and effect of his statements.”

**Reduced ability to resist**

If the suspect had a severely reduced ability to resist, a relatively small amount of coercion might render a statement involuntary. It is important to note, however, that a suspect’s vulnerability may not render a statement involuntary if officers did not exploit it or, as discussed on pages 16-17, there were offsetting circumstances. And if there was no coercion at all, the suspect’s reduced power of resistance would be irrelevant.

What circumstances indicate a reduced ability to resist? The following are frequently cited.

**Minors:** The suspect’s young age is relevant because interrogation is likely to have a more coercive effect on a minor than an adult. Still, many young people today are perfectly capable of dealing with the pressures of interrogation. As the court observed in *In re Jessie L.*:

A minor has the capacity to make a voluntary confession. The admissibility of such a statement depends not upon his age alone but a combination of that factor with other circumstances such as his intelligence, education, experience, and ability to comprehend the meaning and effect of his statements.

**Mental deficiency, lack of education:** An adult or juvenile suspect’s subnormal intelligence, mental disorder, or lack of education are all relevant, but seldom decisive if not exploited.

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129 Dickerson *v.* United States (2000) 530 U.S. 428, 434. ALSO SEE Yarbrough *v.* Alvarado (2004) 541 U.S. 652, 667-88 (“[V]oluntariness of a statement is often said to depend on whether the defendant’s will was overborne, a question that logically can depend on the characteristics of the accused.”); People *v.* Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 502 (“[M]ental condition is relevant to an individual’s susceptibility to police coercion”).

130 See People *v.* Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 502 (“The record does not convince us that the interrogating officers were aware of, or exploited, defendant’s claimed psychological vulnerabilities”); In re Norman H. (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 997, 1003 [there was no showing that his power of resistance “was in any way overcome by reason of the police or anyone else taking unfair or unlawful advantage of his ignorance, mental condition, or vulnerability to persuasion”]. COMPARE Reck *v.* Pate (1961) 367 US 433 [officers exploited the mental state of defendant who was described as “mentally retarded and deficient”].

131 See People *v.* Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1403 [“In arguing that his statements were involuntary, defendant stresses his limited intelligence and developmental disability ... But a statement is voluntary unless there is coercive police activity.”]; People *v.* Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1045 [“Having concluded no coercive threats or promises were made, we cannot conclude that defendant’s statement was involuntary solely because of any alleged physical or mental condition.”].

132 See In re Aven S. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 69, 75 [interrogation is “likely to have a more coercive effect on a child than an adult”]; People *v.* Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 84 [18 years old, “failed to graduate even from continuation high school,” intelligence was “quite low, “background was one of thoroughgoing neglect”]; People *v.* Hinds (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 222, 238 [“The record shows appellant was 19 year old, immature and relatively unsophisticated”].

133 See Gallegos *v.* Colorado (1962) 370 U.S. 49, 55 [“There is no guide to the decision in cases such as this [defendant was 14 years old, except the totality of circumstances”]; People *v.* Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 412 [although 19-years old with a “lack of educational achievement” and “modest level of literacy,” “the record does not even hint that these factors came into play”]; In re Norman H. (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 997, 1002 [15-years old, IQ of 47, but he knew “he did not have to speak to police”].

134 (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 997, 1002 [15-years old, IQ of 47, but he knew “he did not have to speak to police”].

135 See Procunier *v.* Athley (1971) 400 U.S. 446, 453-54 [“low intelligence” is relevant “only in establishing a setting in which actual coercion might have been exerted”]; People *v.* Kelly (1990) 51 Cal.3d 931, 951-54 [“[D]efendant’s low intelligence and psychiatric symptoms, standing alone, do not render his waiver of Miranda rights involuntary.”]; People *v.* Williams (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 145, 152 [“Although undereducated and virtually illiterate ... Williams was neither insane nor incompetent when questioned.”] U.S. *v.* Montgomery (7th Cir. 2009) 555 F.3d 623, 632 [“[Borderline intelligence] alone does not result in a finding of coercion.”].
PHYSICAL AND MENTAL FATIGUE: Just as a suspect’s subnormal intelligence or mental disorder might make the surrounding circumstances appear more coercive, so might exhaustion, extreme nervousness, or acute hunger.136

ILLNESS, INJURIES: Illness or injuries might make the suspect more vulnerable, especially if he was also under the influence of medication.137

DISTRAUGHT: While it is relevant that the suspect was distraught or depressed, it is seldom a significant circumstance unless the condition was severe or if the suspect’s answers were disordered.138

DRUGS AND ALCOHOL: Although a suspect’s consumption of drugs, alcohol, or both will affect his mental alertness, it is not a compelling circumstance unless he was severely impaired. Thus, in United States v. Coleman, the Ninth Circuit noted that, “[a]lthough Defendant’s heroin withdrawal caused lethargy and physical discomfort, such symptoms alone are insufficient to establish voluntariness.”139

LENGTH OF THE INTERVIEW: The length of the interview may be related to physical and mental fatigue, and is therefore relevant. In fact, one of the infamous “third degree” tactics featured relays of officers who would question the suspect continuously for several days. While such a tactic would not be tolerated today, the courts recognize that interrogation sessions lasting even a few hours may wear down the suspect physically and mentally.

Nevertheless, the length of the interview is seldom a significant factor if officers provided breaks when requested or when reasonably necessary.140 For example, in People v. Hill the court rejected the argument that a lengthy interview was coercive because, as the court explained:

The actual interrogation, which was divided into five sessions, comprised only about eight hours. The breaks between sessions were not of insignificant duration. Nor was the period of interrogation unduly lengthy under the circumstances. Defendant was promptly provided with food, beverages, and restroom breaks whenever he requested them.141

LENGTH OF PRE-INTERVIEW DETENTION: For various reasons, it may be necessary or desirable to keep the suspect waiting in an interview room before the interrogation begins. Like the length of the interview itself, this is seldom a significant circumstance

136 See Spano v. New York (1959) 360 U.S. 315, 322 [‘‘[S]lowly mounting fatigue does, and is calculated to, play its part.’’]; People v. Montano (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 914, 936 [‘‘his pleas of fatigue and lack of sleep were ignored’’].

137 See Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 398 [‘‘the suspect “complained to [the officer] that the pain in his leg was ‘unbearable’”’’]; Reck v. Pate (1961) 367 U.S. 433, 441-42 [‘‘He was physically weakened and in intense pain.’’]; People v. Barker (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 921, 934 [‘‘although the suspect was in “severe pain” from a bullet wound, it did not appear that he was suffering from pain severe enough to impair his ability to make a voluntary confession’’]; People v. Adams (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 970, 985 [‘‘suspect was “feeling very weak and her chest was very tight” but she “remained alert”’’]; People v. Perdono (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 605, 612 [‘‘statement not involuntary merely because defendant was in “obvious pain” and was possibly under the influence of morphine’’]; In re Walker (1974) 10 Cal.3d 644, 677 [‘‘such pain does not appear from the officers’ testimony to have reflected on his competency’’].

138 See Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 398-99 [‘‘suspect was “depressed almost to the point of coma,” he was “evidently confused and unable to think clearly” and some of his answers “were on their face not entirely coherent.”’’]; People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 839 [‘‘Appellant was sobbing uncontrollably throughout his statement and vomited. The police were forced to terminate the interrogation due to appellant’s inability to control himself or answer coherently.’’]; People v. Esqueda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1485 [‘‘Esqueda was emotionally distraught and exhausted, yet [the interrogating officers] unremittingly pressured their prey until he finally yielded.’’]. COMPARE People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 993 [‘‘defendant was not distraught but, instead, “became increasingly agitated as he was caught in one lie after another”’’].

139 (9th Cir. 2000) 208 F.3d 786, 791. ALSO SEE People v. Cox (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 980 [‘‘suspect was apparently under the influence of meth but the questioning was “short and simple.”’’]; People v. Johns (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 281, 289-90 [‘‘suspect, who had been shot, had been administered Demerol but he waived his rights, his answers were responsive’’]; U.S. v. Heller (9th Cir. 2009) 551 F.3d 1108, 1113 [‘‘there is no other evidence to suggest that the type, dosage, or timing of the Tylenol III influenced Heller’s will to resist questioning.’’].

140 See Martin v. Wainwright (11th Cir. 1985) 770 F.2d 918, 927 [‘‘Martin was questioned off and on rather than continuously, and fatigue does not appear to have been a factor in Martin’s decision to confess.’’]; People v. Jablonksi (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 815 [‘‘[T]he interrogation was spread over a four-hour period from midmorning to midafternoon with a refreshment break and a lunch break.’’]; People v. Maestas (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1499, 1505 [‘‘Although he was in custody for more than seven and one-half hours before he finally admitted his involvement in the murder, he was not interrogated during a significant period of this time’’].

141 (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 981.
unless the wait was excessive, the suspect was especially vulnerable, or if officers neglected to check periodically to see if he needed food, water, or a visit to the restroom.142

**Increased ability to resist**

In contrast to the circumstances that tend to increase a suspect’s vulnerability, the following factors are often cited by the courts as indications the suspect had an increased ability to resist the pressures of interrogation.

**EXPERIENCE WITH OFFICERS:** A suspect may be less susceptible to coercion if, because of several arrests or other contacts with officers, he had become accustomed to interacting with them.143 As the Supreme Court observed, “What would be overpowering to the weak of will or mind might be utterly ineffective against an experienced criminal.”144

**HARDENED, “STREET WISE”:** While often related to the suspect’s prior interactions with officers, his general toughness or callousness are highly relevant circumstances. Thus, in *People v. Williams* the California Supreme Court rejected a claim of involuntariness because, among other things, “The [trial] court described defendant as a ‘street kid, street man,’ in his ‘early 20s, big, strong, bright, not intimidated by anybody, in robust good health,’ and displaying ‘no emotionalism [or signs of] mental weakness.’”145 And in *Stein v. New York* the U.S. Supreme Court noted, “These men were not young, soft, ignorant or timid. They were not inexperienced in the ways of crime and its detection, nor were they dumb as to their rights.”146

### Lies, Craftiness

It is significant that the suspect lied to officers or was crafty in handling their questions, as this tends to prove he was not overwhelmed by their interrogation methods. This is an especially important circumstance because it is a common occurrence. For example, in rejecting arguments that defendants felt coerced, the courts have noted the following:

- “Defendant admittedly lied to the detectives throughout the interview. This is not the behavior of one whose free will [was] overborne.”147
- “Even when he later admitted his presence at the scene of the murders, he insisted that he had played no role in the killings.”148
- “[E]ven after the police showed defendant the fake [lie detector] test results, defendant continued to deny involvement in the crime.”149
- Defendant “was keen enough to change his story to fit the facts.”150
- “His resistance, far from reflecting a will overborne by official coercion, suggests instead a still operative ability to calculate his self-interest in choosing whether to disclose or withhold information.”151
- Defendant “was probing to find out how much the officers knew.”152
- The defendants’ confessions “obviously came when they were convinced that their dance was over and the time had come to pay the fiddler. Even then, [one of them] was so far in control of himself and the situation as to dictate the quid pro quo for which he would confess.”153

144 *Stein v. New York* (1953) 346 U.S. 156, 185. ALSO SEE *Martin v. Wainwright* (11th Cir. 1985) 770 F.2d 918, 926 [“What would be overpowering to the weak of will or mind might be utterly ineffective against an experienced criminal.”].
145 (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635. 659.
146 (1953) 346 U.S. 156, 185-86.
150 *People v. Lewis* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1, 59.
152 *U.S. v. Bassignani* (9th Cir. 2009) 560 F.3d 989, 995.
Suspect wanted to talk: The suspect’s eagerness to talk with the officers—whether sincere or feigned—is an indication that he felt confident and able to deal with pressure; and so is his declining the officers’ offer to terminate the interview. Thus, in People v. Holloway, the court noted, “Aware his alibi had collapsed, [defendant] wanted to tell the detectives why he had asked Cruz to lie about his whereabouts.”

Suspect later invoked: That the suspect subsequently invoked his Miranda rights indicates he did not feel unduly pressured. As the California Supreme Court pointed out in People v. Richardson, the defendant’s invocation of his Miranda right to counsel is “contrary to his characterization of himself as a helpless, easily confused naïf.”

Rational answers: A suspect’s claim that he was vulnerable because of mental deficiency, fatigue, or the consumption of alcohol or drugs may be disproved by evidence that his answers to the officers’ questions were responsive and coherent. Thus, in People v. Guerra the court noted that the defendant “appreciated subtle nuances in the questions and intelligently answered some poorly phrased compound questions.”

Suspect was composed: The suspect’s calmness or composure in the face of interrogation is another indication that he did not feel pressured. For example, in People v. Storm the California Supreme Court noted that the defendant “appears calm, prepared, and intent on presenting a coherent and sympathetic version of his [defense].”

Similarly, in People v. Bradford, the court pointed out that the trial judge had noted the following: There isn’t any excitement in the voice. There isn’t any nervousness particularly. There isn’t any outward sign of stress. It is just a straight account of what happened, and there is the same tone which prevailed throughout the three tapes. It is unexcited, unforced and voluntary.

The Motivating Cause Requirement

Even if officers utilized coercion to which the suspect was vulnerable, a subsequent statement will not be deemed involuntary unless the coercion was the motivating factor in the suspect’s decision to talk. As the California Supreme Court explained, “Although coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to establish an involuntary confession, it does not itself compel a finding that a resulting

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154 (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 114. Emphasis added. ALSO SEE People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 169-70 [suspect’s willingness to continue the interview after officers offered to end it indicates he did not feel coerced]; People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1041 [court notes that the trial judge said, “The tapes clearly indicate an eagerness to talk all right, and just tell everything that probably could be told, so from that standpoint of voluntariness, there isn’t any question about that.”].

155 (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 993. ALSO SEE U.S. v. Boskic (1st Cir. 2008) 545 F.3d 69, 81 [suspect’s subsequent refusal to give a written statement reflect “an understanding of his right not to cooperate or talk”].

156 See Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157 160-62 [“his answers were intelligible”; People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 993 [his responses did not indicate “mental defect”]; People v. Perdomo (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 605, 618 [suspect’s answers were “appropriate to the question asked”]; U.S. v. Montgomery (7th Cir. 2009) 555 F.3d 623, 633 [“Perhaps most significant of all, he asked relevant questions about his rights prior to giving his statement to the officers.”]; U.S. v. Dehghani (8th Cir. 2008) 550 F.3d 716, 721 [“clear, responsive answers”]; U.S. v. Gaddy (8th Cir. 2008) 532 F.3d 783, 788 [despite sleeplessness, suspect “appeared awake and coherent”]; U.S. v. Howard (8th Cir. 2008) 532 F.3d 755, 763 [“coherent and spoke in a manner which indicated he understood what was happening”].


160 See Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157, 164 [“Absent police conduct causally related to the confession, there is simply no basis for concluding [that the confession was involuntary.”]; People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 114 [“Coercive police tactics by themselves do not render a defendant’s statements involuntary if the defendant’s free will was not in fact overborne by the coercion and his decision to speak instead was based upon some other consideration.”]; People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 85 [the court indicated that the test is whether the coercion played the “dominant role” in causing the statement]; People v. Cahill (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 296, 316 [“dominant focus”]; People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 778-79 [“The requisite causal connection between promise and confession must be more than ‘but for’: causation-in-fact is insufficient.”].
confession is involuntary. The statement and the inducement must be causally linked.\textsuperscript{161} Although the courts will ordinarily presume that such a link existed, the following circumstances may suffice to rebut the presumption.

**The Suspect’s Words:** In some cases, the suspect will say something that proves he was motivated by something other than coercion.\textsuperscript{162} For example, in *People v. Mickey* the California Supreme Court ruled that, based on the suspect's remarks to officers, it was apparent that he made his statement because he wanted to “justify, excuse, or at least explain his problematic conduct.”\textsuperscript{163} The same thing happened in *People v. Benson* in which the court upheld the trial judge's ruling that the defendant “spoke not because of coercion applied by the police but as a result of compunction arising from his own conscience.”\textsuperscript{164}

**Time Lapse:** It is also relevant that the suspect did not immediately respond to the coercive tactics; rather, he gave a statement only after the passage of a significant amount of time.\textsuperscript{165} A court may, however, reject such an argument if the coercion consisted of promises or threats which had not been withdrawn. For example, in *U.S. v. Lopez* the court ruled that a statement made several hours after officers promised 54 fewer years in prison for a confession was involuntary because “there is no indication that [any officer] made any statements to Lopez that might have dissipated the coercive effect of [the officer's] promise of leniency.”\textsuperscript{166}

**Suspect’s Tactical Cooperation:** The presumption that coercion was the motivating factor may be rebutted if the suspect had assumed the role of a helpful witness or victim. In such cases, a court might find that his decision to talk was a calculated ploy; i.e., not a response to coercion. In one such case, the court pointed out that “defendant put herself in a position which made an interview with the police inevitable by fabricating a story that she had been kidnapped.”\textsuperscript{167}

**Independent Intervening Act:** Prosecutors can sometimes prove that the suspect's decision to confess or make a statement resulted from something that occurred after the officers had utilized coercive interrogation tactics.\textsuperscript{168} An example is found in *People v. Williams*\textsuperscript{169} where the defendant initially denied that he was at the scene of a contract killing in which four people were killed. One of the officers then made an implied threat concerning the death penalty, but Williams did not change his story. Later on, one of the officers asked him if he had received all of the money he was owed for the “hit.” In what the California Supreme Court described as an “apparent slipup,” Williams responded by saying that he didn’t get any of the money because he “ran out” on his accomplices—thus inadvertently admitting that he was at the scene. Because it was the slipup that resulted in the admission, not the officer’s earlier threat, the court ruled that Williams’ statement was voluntary.

\textsuperscript{161} *People v. Maury* (2003) 30 Cal.4\textsuperscript{th} 342, 404-5.

\textsuperscript{162} See *Stein v. New York* (1953) 346 U.S. 156, 185 [defendants confessed because of the “inward consciousness of having committed a murder and a robbery and of being confronted with evidence of guilt which they could neither deny nor explain”]; *People v. Storm* (2002) 28 Cal.4\textsuperscript{th} 1007, 1035-36 [confession resulted from defendant’s “troubled conscience, his assumption he would inevitably be caught, and a desire to minimize his culpability”]; *People v. Rundle* (2008) 43 Cal.4\textsuperscript{th} 76, 117 [suspect wanted to “unburden himself”].

\textsuperscript{163} (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 650.

\textsuperscript{164} (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 782.

\textsuperscript{165} See *People v. Thompson* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 169 [“defendant did not make his incriminating statements until several hours after the conversation had turned [to other subjects]”]; *People v. Cahill* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4\textsuperscript{th} 296, 316 (“several hours”); *U.S. v. Dehghani* (8th Cir. 2008) 550 F.3d 716, 720 [suspect “continued to deny involvement” after an officer “slammed his hand on the table and raised his voice”].

\textsuperscript{166} (10th Cir. 2006) 437 F.3d 1059, 1067.

\textsuperscript{167} *People v. Andersen* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 563, 579. ALSO SEE *People v. Guerra* (2006) 37 Cal.4\textsuperscript{th} 1067, 1096 [“Defendant then decided to speak with the detectives, in an effort, the record indicates, to clear himself of suspicion.”].

\textsuperscript{168} See *People v. Williams* (1997) 16 Cal.4\textsuperscript{th} 635, 661 [suspect made the incriminating statement inadvertently; i.e., a “slipup”]; *People v. Thompson* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 169; *People v. Badgett* (1995) 10 Cal.4\textsuperscript{th} 330, 354, fn.6 [“The trial record indicates that Jasik decided to cooperate with the police while she was in jail because of a discussion she had with her mother, and not because of any discussion Jasik had with the authorities about her release”]; *People v. Cahill* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4\textsuperscript{th} 296, 316 [defendant “twice declined the interrogators’ suggestion that the discussion stop.”].

\textsuperscript{169} (1997) 16 Cal.4\textsuperscript{th} 635.
Similarly, in People v. Thompson the court ruled that an officer’s somewhat coercive remark did not render the defendant’s subsequent statement involuntary because, shortly before making the statement, he twice declined “the interrogators’ suggestion that the discussion stop.” Said the court, “From this fact the trial court concluded, and reasonably so, that defendant’s incriminating statements were not induced by any implied threat or promise made hours earlier.”

**Subsequent Statements:** If the defendant made an incriminating statement after making an involuntary statement, the courts will presume that the subsequent statement was motivated by the earlier coercion. In the words of the California Supreme Court, “Where an accused makes one confession and then testifies or upon subsequent questioning again confesses, it is presumed that the testimony or second confession is the product of the first.” Consequently, the second statement will be suppressed unless prosecutors can prove that “the influences under which the original confession was made had ceased to operate before the second statement was made.”

**Rules of Suppression**

If a court finds that a defendant’s incriminating statement was involuntary, the question arises: What will be suppressed? Before we answer that question, there are some foundational matters that should be addressed.

**General principles**

**Constitutional Basis for Suppression:** Coercive interrogation tactics violate one or both of the following constitutional rights. First, the officers’ use of coercion constitutes a violation of the suspect’s Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled to provide testimony against himself. Thus, a civil rights lawsuit may result even if the suspect’s statement was not used against him. Second, a due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment will occur if prosecutors used an involuntary statement against the suspect at his trial.

** Suppressing Admissions and True Statements:** If a statement was involuntary, it will be suppressed regardless of whether it constituted a confession or merely an admission, and regardless of whether it was plainly true.
GOOD FAITH RULE NOT APPLICABLE: An involuntary statement will be suppressed even though the officers believed in good faith that they were not exerting coercive pressure.\textsuperscript{178}

BURDEN OF PROOF: The prosecution has the burden of proving that a defendant’s statement was given voluntarily. In the past, prosecutors could meet this burden only with proof beyond a reasonable doubt. But now the required level of proof is merely a preponderance of the evidence.\textsuperscript{179}

TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES: As noted earlier, the courts will consider the totality of circumstances in determining whether a statement was involuntary. The practical consequences of this rule in suppression hearings were demonstrated in People v. Andersen when the court noted:

Both the defense and the prosecution have extracted sentences and phrases from the interview and presented them in disembodied form separated from the remainder of the interview as evidence of the presence or absence of coercion. We do not think the interview can be properly analyzed in such piece-meal fashion. Rather it must be considered as a whole in the context of the development of the dialogue between interviewers and interviewee and in light of the totality of circumstances surrounding the confession.\textsuperscript{180}

What will be suppressed

If a court rules that a defendant’s confession or admission was involuntary, the following will be suppressed.

STATEMENT TO PROVE GUILT, IMPEACHMENT: The statement cannot be used by prosecutors to prove the defendant’s guilt, nor may it be used to impeach him if he testifies at his trial. As the United States Supreme Court observed, it has “mandated the exclusion of reliable and probative evidence for all purposes” when the evidence “is derived from involuntary statements.”\textsuperscript{181}

THIRD PARTY’S STATEMENT: A defendant may challenge the admissibility of a statement made by a third party on grounds it was involuntary,\textsuperscript{182} even if the statement was plainly true.\textsuperscript{183}

THIRD PARTY’S TRIAL TESTIMONY: If officers coerced a statement from a person who later became a witness against the defendant, the witness’s testimony at the defendant’s trial will not be suppressed as a result of the earlier coerced statement “unless the defendant demonstrates that improper coercion has impaired the reliability of the testimony.”\textsuperscript{184}

PHYSICAL EVIDENCE: If officers discover physical evidence as the result of the defendant’s involuntary statement, the evidence will be suppressed if the defendant can prove that it was the “fruit” of the coercion.\textsuperscript{185} But physical evidence obtained as a result of an involuntary statement by a third party may be suppressed only if the coercion was such that it rendered the evidence unreliable.\textsuperscript{186}

Correction: In the printed edition of the Spring 2009 issue, in the section on warrantless misdemeanor arrests, the text should have said that arrests should ordinarily be made between the hours of 6 A.M. and 10 P.M.

\textsuperscript{179}See People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 455.
\textsuperscript{180} (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 563, 578.
\textsuperscript{181}Michigan v. Harvey (1990) 494 U.S. 344, 351. ALSO SEE Kansas v. Ventris (2009) U.S. [2009 WL 1138842] [the Fifth Amendment “is violated whenever a truly coerced confession is introduced at trial, whether by way of impeachment or otherwise”].
\textsuperscript{182}See People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 966 (“Defendant does have standing, however, to assert that his own due process right to a fair trial was violated as a consequence of the asserted violation of Moody’s Fifth Amendment rights.”); People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 499; People v. Badgett (1995) 10 Cal.4th 330, 344.
\textsuperscript{185}See People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 968.
Recent Cases

Arizona v. Gant

Issue
May officers search a vehicle incident to the arrest of an occupant if the arrestee had been handcuffed and locked in a patrol car?

Facts
Officers in Tucson, Arizona stopped a car driven by Gant because they knew that his driver's license had been suspended and that he was wanted on a warrant for driving on a suspended license. After handcuffing him and locking him in a patrol car, they searched the passenger compartment of his vehicle incident to the arrest (i.e., a Belton search) and found a gun and drugs. When Gant’s motion to suppress the evidence was denied, his case went to trial and he was convicted.

Discussion
Gant argued that the search of his car was unlawful because there was no need for it. In particular, he contended that because the purpose of Belton searches is to prevent arrestees from grabbing hold of weapons or destructible evidence, these searches should not be permitted if they occurred after the arrestee had been secured. In a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court agreed.

In 1969, the Court in Chimel v. California ruled that officers who have made a custodial arrest of a suspect may search the area within the arrestee’s “immediate control” to secure weapons and evidence. It quickly became apparent, however, that officers and judges were having trouble applying Chimel when the place that was searched was a vehicle in which the arrestee had been an occupant. In particular, it was often difficult to determine whether the passenger compartment was within the arrestee’s immediate control when, as is usually the case, he was somewhere outside the vehicle when the search occurred.

About 12 years later, the Court corrected the problem in the case of New York v. Belton. In Belton, the Court began by pointing out that the lower courts “have found no workable definition of the area within the immediate control of the arrestee when that area arguably includes the interior of an automobile and the arrestee is its recent occupant.” This situation, said the Court, was “problematic” because officers in the field needed “a set of rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct determination” of what places and things they may search.

So, after noting that weapons and evidence inside “the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment” of an automobile are “in fact generally, even if not inevitably” within the arrestee’s reach at some point, the Court announced the following “bright line” rule: Officers who have made a custodial arrest of an occupant of a vehicle may search the passenger compartment—regardless of whether the arrestee had physical access when the search occurred. This rule was consistent with the Court’s earlier determination that people have “a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence or as the repository of personal effects.”

In Gant, however, the Court ruled that Belton searches can no longer be based on generalizations and clearly-understood rules. Instead, as we discuss in the Comment, it appears the Court ruled that vehicle searches incident to the arrest of an occupant are now permitted only if the arrestee had immediate access to the passenger compartment at the time the search occurred. Said the Court:

[W]e hold that Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest after the arrestee had been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle.

Consequently, the Court ruled that the search of Gant’s car was unlawful.

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Comment

There are at least three problems with Gant. First, not only did the justices erase Belton’s “bright line,” they replaced it with three separate and conflicting tests for determining when Belton searches are permitted. At one point, they said that the test is access; i.e., a search is permitted if the arrestee had “access” to his car. Elsewhere they said the test was reaching distance; i.e., a search is permitted if the arrestee was “within reaching distance” of the vehicle. But then they proclaimed that access and reaching distance were not enough—the arrestee must also have been unsecured, which presumably meant not handcuffed.

Because this is an issue of some importance to officers and the lower courts—and especially because of the danger and uncertainty that surround street-side arrests—it is hard to imagine how the justices could have failed to notice that their decision was incoherent. Unfortunately, this appears to have been an indication of the quality of thought that went into this regrettable opinion.

Second, the justices claimed that their decision was necessary because the lower courts were interpreting Belton too broadly by permitting searches after the arrestees had been secured. This is simply not true. The lower courts did not expand Belton, they applied it precisely as it was written and intended. The Court in Belton made it clear that it was announcing a broad decision that was needed to provide officers with a “straightforward rule” which, in the context of car searches, meant a rule based on a “generalization” as to the area that was usually within the arrestee’s control in the course of car stops. Accordingly, in announcing its ruling, the Belton Court said, “In order to establish the workable rule this category of cases requires, we read Chimel’s definition of the limits of the area that may be searched in light of that generalization.” Besides, if the courts were grossly misinterpreting Belton, why did it take almost 30 years for the “problem” to come to the Supreme Court’s attention?

Third, as noted earlier, the Gant justices believed that the Belton Court had intended to strictly limit its decision to situations in which the arrestee was unsecured and able to launch an immediate attack on the officers while they conducted the search. But because officers never—ever—turn their backs on unsecured arrestees, it appears that the Gant justices believed that Belton Court had promulgated a rule that would never—ever—be utilized by officers or applied by any court in the nation. Why in the world would the Court have done such a thing?

There is only one plausible explanation: The Court must have been playing a practical joke, possibly hoping to refute the suspicion that the legal profession lacks a sense of humor. Why else would it announce a rule covering such a purely fictional predicament? In fact, it seems likely that, on the day the Belton justices issued their fake opinion, they gathered in their chambers and anxiously awaited news that some judge, law professor, or journalist had exposed their farce. And award him a prize!

It must have been terribly disappointing that no one detected their prank that day. Nor the next. Nor for the next 30 years. But now that the Gant justices have done so, there is only one thing for officers, prosecutors, and judges to say: The joke’s on us!

Anyhow, assuming that Gant itself was not a practical joke (we can only hope), the question arises: What will be its affect on law enforcement? Actually, it may not be as catastrophic as first thought. This is because there are several other legal justifications for searching vehicles in which an arrestee had been an occupant. For one thing, when the arrestee was the driver or registered owner of the vehicle, officers will usually have the authority to tow it, which means they may conduct an inventory search of the vehicle so long as the search was conducted pursuant to standardized criteria and in accordance with departmental regulations.

In addition, Gant did not change the rule that officers may search any vehicle without a warrant if they have probable cause to believe there is evidence

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6 Court: Search was unlawful “because Gant could not have accessed his car to retrieve weapons or evidence at the time of the search.”
5 Court: Search is lawful “only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.”
6 Court: Belton searches are now permitted “only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.” Emphasis added.
* NOTE: For an enlightening discussion of the peculiar legal “principles” upon which Gant is based, see Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in Montejo v. Louisiana (2009) ___ U.S. __ [2009 WL 144049].
of a crime inside.\(^7\) Furthermore, the Court in *Gant* announced a new type of vehicle search: officers may now search the passenger compartment without a warrant if they have reasonable suspicion to believe that it contained evidence pertaining to the crime for which the suspect was arrested.\(^8\) (This exception did not apply in *Gant* because there are no fruits or instrumentalities for the crime of driving on a suspended license.) The Court also said “there may be still other circumstances in which safety or evidentiary interests would justify a search.” But because the Court did not elaborate, it will be the job of the lower courts to figure out what this means.

The Court in *Gant* also reaffirmed its ruling in *Michigan v. Long* that officers may search for weapons in the passenger compartment if, (1) an occupant was lawfully detained or arrested, and (2) the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe there was a weapon inside.\(^9\) Also keep in mind that vehicle searches will usually be permitted if an occupant was on parole or searchable probation, or if the officers obtained consent to search from a person who appeared to be in control of the vehicle.

Finally, a note to prosecutors. When litigating the propriety of pre-*Gant* searches that were lawful under *Belton*, keep in mind that the Supreme Court, in the recent case of *Herring v. United States*, ruled that the suppression of evidence would not be an appropriate remedy when the officers’ conduct was not blameworthy.\(^10\) As the Court explained, “To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.”\(^11\) Plainly, then, it would make no sense to suppress evidence discovered in a lawful *Belton* search that occurred before *Gant* because the officers had done nothing wrong.

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\(^8\) *NOTE*: The Court said, “[C]ircumstances unique to the automobile context justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”


\(^11\) See *U.S. v. Farias-Gonzales* (11th Cir. 2009) __ F.3d __ [2009 WL 232328] [as the result of *Herring* “[w]e now apply the cost-benefit balancing test to the case before us”]; *Illinois v. Krull* (1987) 480 U.S. 340, 348-49 [“E]vidence should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.”].

\(^12\) (1986) 475 U.S. 625.


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**Montejo v. Louisiana**


**Issue**

May officers seek to question a suspect about a crime with which he had been charged and was represented by counsel?

**Facts**

Officers in Gretna, Louisiana arrested Montejo for murdering a man during a robbery. After waiving his *Miranda* rights, Montejo confessed. Three days later, he was arraigned and the public defender was appointed to represent him.

Shortly thereafter, two detectives visited Montejo in jail and, after obtaining a second *Miranda* waiver, asked if he would accompany them to the scene of the crime to look for the murder weapon. Montejo agreed. During the trip the detectives asked Montejo to write “an inculpatory letter of apology to the victim’s widow.” And he did. At his trial, the letter was admitted into evidence and Montejo was convicted. He was sentenced to death.

**Discussion**

On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, Montejo argued that his letter should have been suppressed because it was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, specifically the rule of *Michigan v. Jackson*.\(^12\) In *Jackson*, the Court held that officers may not seek to question a suspect about a crime with which he had been charged if he had invoked his Sixth Amendment rights during an arraignment or other court proceeding. The Court had also ruled that such an invocation occurs automatically if the suspect requested or accepted a court-appointed attorney during the hearing.\(^13\) It was therefore apparent that Montejo’s letter to his

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victim was obtained in violation of \textit{Jackson} because Montejo had been charged with murder, the subject of his letter was the charged murder, and he was represented by counsel on the charge.

But in a dramatic transformation of Sixth Amendment law and police procedure, the Court in \textit{Montejo} overturned \textit{Jackson}, ruling that officers may seek to question represented suspects about crimes with which they had been charged, so long as they obtain a waiver of Sixth Amendment rights from the suspect. (As we discuss in the Comment, a \textit{Miranda} waiver will suffice.)

The main reason for the Court's decision was that the purpose of \textit{Jackson} (to prevent officers from badgering suspects into giving statements) was already being achieved by \textit{Miranda} which prohibits such badgering. As the court observed:

\begin{quote}
[A] defendant who does not want to speak to the police without counsel present need only say as much when he is first approached and given the \textit{Miranda} warnings. At that point, not only must the immediate contact end, but badgering by later requests is prohibited.
\end{quote}

Another reason for overturning \textit{Jackson} was its "substantial costs" to society; i.e., it deterred officers from "trying to obtain voluntary confessions" and thus, it hindered "society's compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law."

The Court disposed of the case by remanding it back to Louisiana so that Montejo could litigate the issue of whether his \textit{Miranda} waiver was knowing and voluntary.

\textbf{Comment}

There are several things about \textit{Montejo} that should be noted. First, it will be a great help to officers because it eliminates the confusion (and there was a lot of it) over when they may question suspects about crimes with which they had been charged. As the \textit{Montejo} Court observed, its decision "changes the legal landscape" and should make this area of the law "easy to apply."

Second, it is still the law that officers may not seek to question suspects who, in conjunction with custodial interrogation, invoke their \textit{Miranda} right to counsel by informing officers that they wanted to talk with a lawyer before questioning or have one present during questioning.\footnote{See \textit{Arizona v. Roberson} (1988) 486 U.S. 675; \textit{McNeil v. Wisconsin} (1991) 501 U.S. 171, 177 ["Once a suspect invokes the \textit{Miranda} right to counsel for interrogation regarding one offense, he may not be reapproached regarding any offense unless counsel is present."]}

As the Court explained, "If Montejo made a clear assertion of the [\textit{Miranda}] right to counsel when officers approached him about accompanying them on the excursion for the murder weapon, then no interrogation should have taken place unless Montejo initiated it."

Third, prior to \textit{Montejo}, if a suspect was charged with a crime, officers were required to comply with the requests or instructions of the suspect's attorney pertaining to questioning; e.g., "Don't question my client."\footnote{See \textit{Moran v. Burbine} (1986) 475 U.S. 412; \textit{People v. Ledesma} (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 682.} It would appear, however, that this rule has been abrogated by \textit{Montejo}.

Fourth, the Court ruled that ability of officers to seek interviews with charged suspects is not affected by anything the suspect or his attorney said at arraignment. "What matters," said the Court, "is what happens when the defendant is approached for interrogation, and (if he consents) what happens during the interrogation—not what happened at [the arraignment]."\footnote{\textit{McNeil v. Wisconsin} (1991) 501 U.S. 171, 182, fn.3 ["Most rights must be asserted when the government seeks to take the action they protect against."]}

This makes the law easier to apply because officers seldom know what the suspect or judge said during arraignment. Thus, it is now immaterial that the suspect asked the judge to appoint an attorney to represent him; or that the judge, without being asked to do so, referred the suspect to the public defender.

Fifth, as noted, officers must obtain a Sixth Amendment waiver before questioning a suspect about a crime with which he had been charged. This can be accomplished by obtaining a \textit{Miranda} waiver because the Supreme Court has ruled that a suspect who waives his \textit{Miranda} rights also effectively waives his Sixth Amendment rights. As the \textit{Montejo} Court pointed out, "[W]hen a defendant is read his \textit{Miranda} rights (which include the right to have counsel present during interrogation) and agrees to waive those rights, that typically does the trick."

\begin{flushleft}
\footnote{14 See \textit{Arizona v. Roberson} (1988) 486 U.S. 675; \textit{McNeil v. Wisconsin} (1991) 501 U.S. 171, 177 ["Once a suspect invokes the \textit{Miranda} right to counsel for interrogation regarding one offense, he may not be reapproached regarding any offense unless counsel is present."]}
\footnote{16 ALSO SEE \textit{McNeil v. Wisconsin} (1991) 501 U.S. 171, 182, fn.3 ["Most rights must be asserted when the government seeks to take the action they protect against."]}
\end{flushleft}
Finally, the California Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit prosecutors from communicating with a defendant who is represented by counsel if, (1) the communication concerns a crime for which he is represented, and (2) the defendant’s attorney did not consent to the communication. But this rule does not affect officers because, as the *Montejo* Court pointed out, the Constitution “does not make investigating police officers lawyers.”

**Kansas v. Ventris**


**Issue**

If officers obtain a statement from a suspect in violation of the Sixth Amendment, may prosecutors use the statement to impeach him at trial?

**Facts**

Donnie Ventris and his girlfriend Rhonda Theel were arrested and charged with murdering a man during a robbery in Kansas. Prior to trial, the investigating officers planted an informant in Ventris’s cell. Although the officers had instructed the informant to just “keep his ear open and listen” for incriminating statements, he did more than just listen—he asked Ventris if he had something serious “weighing in on his mind.” In response, Ventris admitted that he had “shot this man in his head and in his chest” and robbed him.

At trial, prosecutors conceded that the informant’s conduct constituted a violation of Ventris’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which meant they could not use the statement to prove he was guilty. But in the course of the trial Ventris testified and blamed the robbery and shooting on Theel. Because this testimony was inconsistent with the statement he had made to the informant, the trial judge permitted prosecutors to impeach Ventris by presenting testimony of the informant that Ventris admitted he was the shooter.

Ventris was convicted, but the Kansas Supreme Court reversed the conviction, ruling that statements obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment cannot be utilized by prosecutors for any purpose. The state appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

**Discussion**

In the landmark case of *Massiah v. United States*, the Supreme Court ruled that a Sixth Amendment violation results when a jailhouse informant “deliberately elicits” an incriminating statement from an inmate about a crime with which the inmate had been charged. The Court subsequently pointed out in *Kuhlman v. Wilson* that a Sixth Amendment violation does not result if the informant merely acted as an “ear” or “listening post” and merely reported back on what the suspect had said. As the Court explained:

[A] defendant does not make out a violation of [the Sixth Amendment] simply by showing that an informant, either through prior arrangement or voluntarily, reported his incriminating statements to the police. Rather, the defendant must demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks.

As noted, Kansas prosecutors believed that the informant’s comment to Ventris went beyond “merely listening.” Thus, they conceded that Ventris’s statement was obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment and that it was properly suppressed for the purpose of proving that Ventris was guilty. (The Supreme Court seemed to question the wisdom of this concession when it said, “Without affirming that this concession was necessary [citing *Kuhlman*], we accept it as the law of the case.”)

The issue, then, was whether the statement should also have been suppressed for impeachment purposes. As noted, the Kansas Supreme Court said yes, but the United States Supreme Court disagreed for essentially two reasons.

First, because statements that are obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment cannot be used to prove that a defendant was guilty, a rule that permits prosecutors to use the statement in court to

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17 Rule 2-100, California Rules of Professional Conduct.
impeach the defendant hardly provides officers with an incentive to violate the law themselves or instruct their informants to do so. Said the Court, “Officers have significant incentive to ensure that they and their informants comply with the Constitution’s demands, since statements lawfully obtained can be used for all purposes rather than simply for impeachment.”

Second, suppressing a statement for impeachment encourages perjury and undermines “the integrity of the trial process.” As the Court explained, “Once the defendant testifies in a way that contradicts prior statements, denying the prosecution use of the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process is a high price to pay for vindication of the right to counsel at the prior stage.”

Accordingly, the Court ruled that Ventris’s admission was properly used to impeach him at trial.

People v. Smith

Issue
Under what circumstances may officers conduct “reach in” searches of parolees?

Facts
At about 11:30 A.M., two Vallejo police officers detained two suspected burglars outside a hotel in an area with a “high incidence of drug activity.” When one of the men, Smith, admitted that he was on parole for possession of drugs for sale, an officer decided to conduct a parole search. Although he found no contraband during a pat search and a search of Smith’s car, the officer testified that he had a “gut feeling” that Smith was concealing drugs in his underwear. So he told him that he was “gonna check his pants and see if he had anything in there.” At that point, Smith resisted and was restrained.

After Smith calmed down, the officer decided that, in order to protect Smith’s privacy, it would be best to search him in the back of the hotel’s parking lot. When they arrived, the officer positioned Smith “inside the crook of the open back door of a patrol car” while other officers positioned themselves so as to block the view. As for the search itself, the officer testified that he “removed Smith’s belt, unbuttoned and unzipped Smith’s pants and pulled them down ‘a foot or so.’” He then pulled the elastic waistband of Smith’s underwear “out away from his body,” at which point he saw a “large bag the size of a baseball sitting right on top of his penis.” The officer removed the bag and found that it contained several baggies of heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine.

Smith’s motion to suppress the evidence was denied and he was convicted.

Discussion
Smith acknowledged that the officer had a right to search him pursuant to the terms of parole, but he argued that the search was unlawful because it exceeded the permissible scope of a parole search. The court disagreed.

Officers who are searching a parolee may conduct a reasonably thorough search, but it must not be “extreme or patently abusive.” Smith contended that the search in the parking lot was abusive because it constituted a “strip search,” and that officers should not be permitted to conduct strip searches of parolees, especially in a public place.

But was it really a “strip search?” Smith argued it was because the Penal Code broadly defines a “strip search” as any search in which the person is required “to remove or arrange some of all of his or her clothing so as to permit a visual inspection of the underclothing, breasts, buttocks, or genitalia of such person.” The court pointed out, however, that this definition of “strip search” was intended to apply only to booking searches of people who were arrested for misdemeanors and infractions. Thus, it ruled the search here was not a strip search, but merely a “reach in.” It also ruled that, like most other searches, “reach ins” are permitted if the need for the exploration outweighed its intrusiveness.

Because the need for parole searches is obviously strong, the issue in Smith was whether this need

20 See United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218, 236 (“While thorough, the search partook of none of the extreme or patently abusive characteristics which were held to violate the Due Process Clause”); People v. Laiwa (1983) 34 Cal.3d 711, 726.
21 Pen. Code § 4030(c).
22 At fn. 8.
outweighed the intrusiveness of this particular “reach in.” The court ruled it did for two reasons. First, the officers reduced the intrusiveness of the search by conducting it in a location where it was unlikely that any passerby would observe it. Said the court:

[The search] was conducted in the back of a hotel parking lot in an area that did not face the street, was fenced-off on at least one side, and was not heavily frequented. Before the search, the officers also moved Smith to a less exposed location, inside the crook between the open rear door of the patrol car and the body of the car, and stood around him to obstruct visibility.

Second, the court noted that the search was “limited to that necessary to determine whether Smith was concealing narcotics.” “The evidence shows,” said the court, that the officer “lowered Smith’s pants ‘a foot or so’ and pulled back the elastic waistband of his underwear, permitting a visual inspection of his crotch area. Smith’s belt was the only item of clothing removed, his private parts were not exposed, and there is no evidence that [the officer] touched Smith’s private area—he simply retrieved the bag of drugs.”

Although it was apparent that the officer did not have probable cause or even reasonable suspicion to believe that Smith was carrying drugs, the court ruled that the search was not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing because of the “high level of illegal drug activity in the area,” Smith’s prior narcotics conviction, and the fact that “dealers frequently hide drugs near their genitals.” For these reasons, the court affirmed Smith’s conviction.

Comment

The ruling in Smith raises an interesting question: May officers also conduct “reach ins” of arrestees when searching them incident to arrest. There does not appear to be any logical reason to prohibit them, as the privacy interests of parolees and arrestees are about the same. But we will have to wait to see how this issue develops.

Fisher v. City of San Jose

(9th Cir. en banc 2009) 558 F.3d 1069

Issue

Did officers violate Fisher’s civil rights when they arrested him without a warrant in his apartment?

Facts

At about 1 A.M., Fisher was inside his apartment in San Jose, drinking beer and cleaning his guns. A security guard for the apartment complex wanted to talk to him about loud music that a neighbor was playing, so the guard motioned to Fisher through a window. When Fisher stepped out, he was carrying a rifle which he pointed at the guard. The guard asked if he knew the people who were making the noise, at which point Fisher’s tone “became aggressive,” he began “ranting about the Second Amendment” and saying his neighbors were “vampires.”

It appeared to the guard that Fisher was drunk. Fearing for his safety, the guard notified his supervisor who called San Jose police. The situation developed as follows (times are approximate):

1 A.M.: Officers surrounded the apartment. A sergeant persuaded Fisher to walk onto the patio to discuss the situation, but Fisher “lapsed into a rambling, belligerent diatribe about his Second Amendment rights” and threatened to shoot the sergeant, saying he had 18 guns in his apartment. After Fisher went back inside, his wife walked out and confirmed that he was heavily armed and drunk. At various times during the next few hours, Fisher threatened to shoot the officers.

2:25 A.M.: An officer saw Fisher loading a rifle, then holding it while “pacing through his apartment.” Another officer saw him loading several magazines with ammunition and “strategically placing his guns around his apartment.”

3 A.M.: A police negotiator tried to speak with Fisher, but he pointed a rifle at her and threatened to shoot.

23 NOTE: The court also observed that, based on decisions in other jurisdictions, it appears that “the courts are particularly likely to deem a ‘reach in’ search tolerable when the police take proper steps to diminish the invasion of a suspect’s privacy during a search in a public area.” Citing Jenkins v. State (Fla. Supreme 2009) 978 So.2d 116, 125-28; U.S. v. Williams (8th Cir. 2007) 477 F.3d 977; U.S. v. Ashley (D.C. Cir. 1994) 37 F.3d 678, 682.
7:00 A.M.: The SJPD MERGE unit took control of the scene. Some of the first-responding officers returned to the station to write their reports.
7:00 A.M. – 2:00 P.M.: Officers tried to end the standoff by, among other things, shutting off the power to the apartment, tossing a “throw phone” onto the patio, and deploying flashbangs and tear gas. Nothing worked.
2:15 P.M.: Fisher exited and was arrested.

After pleading no contest to a misdemeanor charge of brandishing a firearm, Fisher sued the city, claiming that the officers’ actions constituted an unlawful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The jury reached a unanimous verdict: the officers had acted properly. But the trial judge, U.S. Magistrate Patricia Trumbull, overturned the verdict, ruling that Fisher had been unlawfully arrested because the officers should have obtained an arrest warrant at some point before they arrested him. The judge then awarded Fisher nominal damages of $1 and ordered the police department to train its officers on the laws she thought they violated. The city appealed to the Ninth Circuit.

Although Fisher was not physically arrested until he stepped outside his apartment, it was conceded on appeal that he was, for Fourth Amendment purposes, “arrested” when officers surrounded his apartment. Thus, the legality of the arrest depended on whether the officers complied with the so-called Ramey-Payton rule which prohibits officers from arresting a suspect inside his home unless, (1) they had an arrest warrant, (2) an occupant consented to their entry, or (3) there were exigent circumstances. Because the officers did not have a warrant or consent, the issue was whether there were exigent circumstances.24

The city took the position that Fisher was arrested at or before 6:30 A.M. when the situation was still in its precarious early stages. But a divided three-judge panel viewed the situation much differently. Although it agreed that Fisher was arrested at 6:30 A.M., it ruled that he was also technically arrested at least three times after that. Moreover, it concluded that after 6:30 A.M., the exigent circumstances no longer existed, mainly because that was the last time anyone had seen Fisher holding a gun; and shortly after that, some of the patrol officers left the scene to write their reports.

Thus, the panel concluded that all of the subsequent “arrests” were unlawful under Ramey-Payton because exigent circumstances no longer existed when they occurred. The Ninth Circuit granted en banc review of the panel’s decision.

Discussion

At the outset, the court summarized the rule that the panel had adopted and which Fisher was now advocating: “Implicit in Fisher’s argument is the following premise: in an armed standoff, once a suspect is seized by virtue of being surrounded and ordered to surrender, the passage of time may operate to liberate that suspect, re-kinde...”

It is apparent, said the court, that such an interpretation of armed standoffs makes no sense, as they are not composed to discrete episodes, each requiring a new threat assessment. Said the court: “[D]uring such a standoff, once exigent circumstances justify the warrantless seizure of the suspect in his home, and so long as the police are actively engaged in completing his arrest, police need not obtain an arrest warrant before taking the suspect into full physical custody. This remains true regardless of whether the exigency that justified the seizure has dissipated by the time the suspect is taken into full physical custody. The court also noted the patent absurdity of the panel’s rule requiring that officers at armed standoffs consult with a judge to determine the best course of action. In the words of the court, “But suggesting that a judge should be telling police in the middle of the standoff that they must withdraw or what tactics are permissible does not strike us as a reasonable role for a judicial officer under the Fourth Amendment.” Thus, the court ruled that Fisher’s civil rights were not violated.

Comment

Because the court’s analysis was so sensible, it is astonishing that four judges dissented, thus demonstrating a willful blindness or mind-boggling confusion as to the nature of armed standoffs. According to the dissenters, officers on the scene should be required to assess each passing moment for signs that the deadly exigent circumstances that existed at the outset had diminished to the point that one phase of the incident had concluded and another, a less deadly one, had begun.

Thus, it was hardly surprising that one of the dissenters was Steven Reinhardt, a judge whose legal judgment has been repeatedly called into question by the Supreme Court. In fact, he is reputed to be the most overruled judge in the nation’s history.

The inability of Judge Reinhardt and the other three to appreciate the difficulties that officers face in such a standoff was demonstrated 10 days after this opinion was filed when a parolee shot and killed two Oakland police officers, and then engaged SWAT officers in an armed standoff, during which he killed two more. We are fairly certain that, unlike the dissenting judges, most people believe that officers who are confronting armed and barricaded suspects should be permitted to focus their full attention on keeping themselves and others safe.

Tennison v. City of San Francisco
(9th Cir. 2009) 548 F.3d 1293

Issues

(1) If officers were aware of evidence that tended to exonerate a defendant, can they satisfy their duty to disclose the information by mentioning it in a memo included in the file they sent to prosecutors?
(2) Must officers reveal that a person confessed to a crime after someone else had been convicted?

Facts

In the Hunter’s Point area of San Francisco, several men in a pickup truck were chasing a car driven by Roderick Shannon. When the car crashed into a fence, the men converged on Shannon and beat him. Then someone fired a shot that killed him.

In the course of their investigation, homicide inspectors developed probable cause to believe that John Tennison and Antoine Goff were involved. After the men were arrested, one of the inspectors received a telephone call from a woman named Chante Smith who said she saw the people who had chased Shannon, and she identified two of them as Luther Blue and Lovinsky Ricard. She also said that Ricard was the shooter. When the inspector asked if Tennison and Goff were also there, she said no. When questioned, Ricard denied any involvement.

Although a memo covering these developments was included in the file sent to the DA, the inspectors did not call it to the attention of the prosecutor on the case. The defense attorneys were also unaware of it. Tennison and Goff were convicted.

One month later, SFPD Gang Task Force officers arrested Ricard on a narcotics warrant. Because they had worked on the Shannon case, they Mirandized him and questioned him about the murder. The interview was videotaped and Ricard “was disguised under a hood and unidentified.” During the interview, he admitted that he was the shooter and he provided details that were consistent with those furnished by Smith. One of the officers testified that he gave a copy of the video to one of the inspectors, but it appears that neither the video nor the fact that Ricard had confessed were disclosed to the DA or the defense attorneys until it was revealed inadvertently on the third day of a hearing on a motion for a new trial. Despite the new information, the motion was denied, mainly because of inconsistencies in Ricard’s confession. Tennison and Goff were sentenced to state prison.

Nearly 13 years later, this information was disclosed at a federal habeas corpus proceeding. As a result, Tennison and Goff were declared factually innocent and released from prison. They then filed a federal civil rights action against the inspectors on grounds they had withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland. When the district court ruled that the inspectors were not entitled to qualified immunity, they appealed.

Discussion

At the outset, the court pointed out that, while prosecutors certainly have a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence, so do law enforcement officers. As the court observed in United States v. Blanco,
“[E]xculpatory evidence cannot be kept out of the hands of the defense just because the prosecutor does not have it, where an investigating agency does.”26 With this in mind, the court addressed the two issues on appeal.

**FAILURE TO DISCLOSE SMITH’S STATEMENT:** The inspectors argued that they had not, in fact, withheld the information furnished by Smith because they had placed a summary of her statement in the file they sent to the DA. But the court ruled this was not enough—that officers must affirmatively notify prosecutors when such vitally important evidence exists. Said the court:

Placing notes regarding Smith’s statements in the police file did not fulfill the Inspectors’ duty to disclose exculpatory information to the prosecutor. Evidence that a person, known to the officers, has told the officers that they have arrested the wrong people, has identified the people involved, including the shooter, and described the cars and the chase in a manner consistent with the evidence, should not have been buried in a file, but should have been made known to the prosecutor.

**FAILURE TO DISCLOSE RICARD’S CONFESSION:** The inspectors argued that the failure to disclose Ricard’s confession did not constitute a Brady violation because, (1) defense counsel was eventually notified of the confession at the hearing on the motion for a new trial, and (2) the confession was “inherently unbelievable.” But the court ruled that the disclosure occurred “much too late” to be of value at the hearing and, furthermore, if there were questions about the reliability of Ricard’s confession “it was the prerogative of the defendant and his counsel—and not of the prosecution—to exercise judgment in determining whether the defendant should make use of it.” The court then ruled that Ricard’s confession “certainly undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial,” and thus “it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that such material should have been disclosed to the defense.”

For these reasons, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling that the inspectors were not entitled to qualified immunity.

**Comment**

The importance of furnishing exculpatory evidence to defense counsel was highlighted recently when a federal judge in Washington D.C. dismissed all charges against former U.S. Senator Ted Stevens who had been convicted of lying on a Senate disclosure form. Attorney General Eric Holder requested the dismissal when he learned that prosecutors had failed to turn over exculpatory evidence to Stevens’ lawyers. The judge later ordered a criminal investigation into the conduct of the prosecutors.

**People v. Richard Allen Davis**
(2009) __ Cal.4th __ [2009 WL 1515177]

**Issues**

(1) Did a kidnapping suspect’s remark—“Well then book me and let’s get a lawyer”—constitute an invocation of his Miranda right to counsel? (2) Did an officer violate the suspect’s Miranda rights when he later asked him if the kidnapping victim was still alive?

**Facts**

On October 1, 1993 at about 11 P.M., a career criminal named Richard Allen Davis broke into a home in Petaluma and walked into the bedroom of 12-year old Polly Klass who was having a slumber party with two other girls. After telling the girls not to scream “or I’ll slit your throats,” Davis kidnapped Polly and drove her to a remote area off Pythian Road between Santa Rosa and Sonoma where he sexually assaulted her. Having determined that he had to kill her to avoid returning to prison, he strangled her and dumped the body in a remote area just south of Cloverdale.

The kidnapping was covered extensively by the national media, and the investigation was intense. In addition to Petaluma and Sonoma County investigators, as many as 75 FBI agents were assigned to the case. Although the nightmare crime resulted in thousands of leads, there were no significant developments until November 27th. That was when Polly’s clothing was found at the Pythian Road clearing.

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26 (9th Cir. 2004) 392 F.3d 382, 388.
The case developed quickly after that. Investigators learned that sheriff’s deputies had contacted Davis near Pythian Road within hours of the kidnapping after a nearby resident reported that Davis’s car was stuck in a ditch, and that Davis appeared odious and “scary.” (The deputies had not yet been notified of the kidnapping.) Investigators then learned that Davis was a parolee-at-large who was currently living at his sister’s home in Mendocino County. So, on November 30th they went to the house and arrested him on the parole violation warrant.

**The November 30th Interview:** A Petaluma police officer and an FBI agent met with Davis at the Mendocino County Jail and, after obtaining a *Miranda* waiver, asked him questions about his whereabouts on October 1st. The agent then accused him of abducting Polly, and the officer alluded to “trace evidence and DNA evidence” that linked Davis to the murder. At that point, Davis stood up and said, “Well then book me and let’s get a lawyer and let’s go for it . . . . Let’s shit or get off the pot.” When the FBI agent responded, “It’s going to happen,” Davis said, “That’s the end, the end.” When asked if he still wanted to talk, Davis responded, “Get real.” The investigators then asked Davis why he had abducted Polly, and he responded, “I didn’t kidnap that fucking broad man. . . . Get me a lawyer and let’s go down the road.” The officer asked, “So you want a lawyer?” and Davis responded “Hey, it’s over and done now. Like I say, shit or get off the pot.”

**The December 4th Statements:** After criminalists matched Davis’s palm print with a print found in Polly’s bedroom, Sgt. Michael Meese of the Petaluma Police Department met with Davis at the jail and asked him questions about his whereabouts on October 1st. The agent then accused him of abducting Polly, and the officer alluded to “trace evidence and DNA evidence” that linked Davis to the murder. At that point, Davis said, “Well then book me and let’s get a lawyer and let’s go for it . . . . Let’s shit or get off the pot.” When the FBI agent responded, “It’s going to happen,” Davis said, “That’s the end, the end.” When asked if he still wanted to talk, Davis responded, “Get real.” The investigators then asked Davis why he had abducted Polly, and he responded, “I didn’t kidnap that fucking broad man. . . . Get me a lawyer and let’s go down the road.” The officer asked, “So you want a lawyer?” and Davis responded “Hey, it’s over and done now. Like I say, shit or get off the pot.”

**The December 4th Statements:** After criminalists matched Davis’s palm print with a print found in Polly’s bedroom, Sgt. Michael Meese of the Petaluma Police Department met with Davis at the jail and asked if there was “any hope” that Polly was alive; and, if so, he asked him to “give thought to talking to him.” Meese added that he had “enough physical evidence to make the case” and that if Davis decided he wanted to talk, he should call him. About 15 minutes after Meese left, Davis notified a corrections officer that he wanted to talk to the sergeant. Shortly thereafter, Sgt. Meese spoke with Davis on the phone, with Davis saying, “I fucked up big time.” Sgt. Meese then asked if Polly was still alive and Davis said no. After asking for protective custody and a pack of cigarettes, Davis said he would show him where the body was located. A few hours later, Sgt. Meese, an FBI agent, and DA’s investigator met with Davis and, after obtaining a *Miranda* waiver, elicited a lengthy video statement. After that, Davis led them to Polly’s remains.

Davis’s statements were used against him at trial and he was found guilty of, among other things, first degree murder, burglary, and attempted lewd act against a child. He was sentenced to death.

**Discussion**

Davis contended that his statements should have been suppressed because they were obtained in violation of *Miranda*. The court disagreed.

**The November 30th Interview:** Davis argued that he had invoked his *Miranda* right to counsel when he said, “Well then book me and let’s get a lawyer and let’s go for it . . . .” The United States Supreme Court has ruled that an invocation of the *Miranda* right to counsel occurs only when the suspect, during custodial interrogation or shortly beforehand, clearly and unambiguously stated that he wanted to talk with a lawyer or have one present during questioning.27 Although it is true that Davis’s words would appear to constitute an invocation in the abstract, the trial court concluded that, in the context of what Davis and the investigators had been saying at that point, he was merely “standing up and issuing ‘a challenge’ to his questioners: If you can prove it, go for it.” The California Supreme Court agreed, saying, “Here defendant’s initial comments were not an unambiguous invocation of the right to immediate presence of an attorney.” But the court ruled that Davis did clearly invoke his right to counsel when he later blurted out, “Get me a lawyer and let’s go down the road . . . Hey, it’s over and done now.” It also concluded, however, that any error in admitting Davis’s subsequent statements during that interview was harmless because they were not incriminating.

**The December 4th Statements:** As noted, four days later Sgt. Meese met with Davis and told him that investigators now had “enough physical evidence to make the case.” Sgt. Meese then asked Davis if there was “any hope” that Polly was alive, and that he “ought to give thought to talking to him.” About 15 minutes after Sgt. Meese left, Davis told a corrections officer that he wanted to talk to Meese.  

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This led to his admissions that he had “fucked up big time,” and that Polly was dead.

The United States Supreme Court has ruled that officers may not seek to question a suspect who had previously invoked his Miranda right to counsel. There is, however, an exception to this rule known as the “public safety” or “rescue” doctrine. Specifically, officers may seek to question a suspect who has invoked—and may question him without obtaining a Miranda waiver—if, (1) the officers reasonably believed that the suspect had information that would help them save a life or prevent serious injury, and (2) their questions were reasonably necessary to eliminate the threat. This exception is based on the sound principle that, when a substantial threat to people could be reduced or eliminated by questioning a suspect, it is not in the public interest to require officers to begin by warning him, essentially, that he’d be better off if he refused to assist them.

Davis argued that the rescue doctrine did not apply here because he had kidnapped Polly over two months earlier, and that it would have been unreasonable to believe that a missing kidnap victim would still be alive after such a long time. The court disagreed, saying “the length of time a kidnap victim has been missing is not, by itself, dispositive of whether a rescue is still reasonably possible.” Moreover, when Davis confronted the girls in Polly’s bedroom he claimed that he was “only doing this for the money,” thus implying he did not intend to kill her. Furthermore, no blood had been discovered at the Pythian road site. The court went on to say:

Here, the police and the FBI continued to try to locate the kidnapped Polly during the four days after defendant had invoked his right to counsel and made no statements regarding Polly’s whereabouts. But that search proved fruitless. Defendant was law enforcement’s best hope to gain vital information about Polly, who had been missing for over two months after defendant had kidnapped her: Where was she? Was she still alive? The questions posed to defendant on the morning of December 4, 1993, were specifically aimed at getting answers to those questions. So long as she remained missing, her safety was of paramount importance.

Under these “extraordinary circumstances,” said the court, Sgt. Meese’s inquiry “did not violate the high court’s decisions in Miranda.” And because the inquiry did not violate Miranda, Davis’s subsequent request to speak with the sergeant was not the fruit of a Miranda violation.

Thus, the court ruled that Davis’s incriminating statements were admissible, as was the testimony of officers that Davis led them to Polly’s remains. The court also affirmed the death sentence.

Comment

Even if Davis’s statements had been obtained in violation of Miranda, it would have made no sense to suppress them because Davis's own words demonstrated that he did not feel the slightest bit of coercion as the result of anything the investigators said to him before or during the interviews.

Keep in mind that the sole purpose of Miranda compliance is to alleviate the coerciveness that is inherent in custodial interrogation. It would seem, therefore, that if a court finds beyond a reasonable doubt—that based on the suspect’s words, criminal history, or other circumstances—that the suspect was simply not vulnerable to coercion, it should be permitted to rule that Miranda compliance was unnecessary.

There is already substantial precedent for such a rule. As we discussed in the article on interrogation in this edition, a statement will not be suppressed on grounds that it resulted from coercion if a court finds that the suspect was able to resist it. And after reading the transcripts of the interviews with Davis, most people would probably agree that, of all the words that could be used to describe him, “vulnerable” was not one of them. Just listen:

“Well then book me and let’s get a lawyer and let’s go for it . . . Let’s shit or get off the pot . . . Get me a lawyer and let’s go down the road . . . Hey, it’s over and done now . . . Like I say, shit or get off the pot, let’s go . . . I didn’t kidnap that fucking broad . . .”

Thanks to Davis, we now have a Three Strikes law in California. It would be fitting if he also brought us a “thug” exception to Miranda.

The Changing Times

Sergeant Mark Dunakin
Sergeant Ervin Romans
Sergeant Daniel Sakai
Officer John Hege

On March 21, 2009, Oakland police officers Mark Dunakin, Ervin Romans, Daniel Sakai and John Hege were shot and killed by a parolee who was also killed. While people throughout the country were saddened, the law enforcement community in the Bay Area was—and remains—distraught. (See the report from Emeryville PD.) The Oakland Police Officers Association expressed the feelings of many when it said:

The Oakland Police Department lost a piece of its heart on Saturday March 21, 2009. They were fathers, sons, brothers, husbands and sweethearts. They all had beautiful families and so many friends. You will be missed, our brothers, but we will never forget you.

ALAMEDA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE

Retired lieutenant of inspectors John Agler died on March 19, 2009. John retired in 1993 after 17 years of service. Before joining the District Attorney’s Office in 1975, he was an officer with Oakland Police Department. Former prosecutor Andy Sweet was appointed to the Superior Court of California in Marin County.

ALAMEDA COUNTY NARCOTICS TASK FORCE

Transferring out: Dawn Sullivan (ACSO) and Miguel Ibarra (ACSO). Sgt. Steve Brown (ACSO) was promoted to lieutenant and assigned to the Glenn Dyer Jail. Sgt. Kevin Willis (ACSO) transferred in and was appointed Administrative Sergeant.

ALBANY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Megan Magers-Rankin and Deanna Woods were appointed Parking Enforcement Officers. Clerk Typist Deana Wang was appointed Police Services Technician.

BART POLICE DEPARTMENT

Mark Moran retired after 11 years of service. Daniel Ploscaru received a disability retirement. Shane Coduti and Richard Jacobson (Contra Costa County SD laterals) were hired as police officers. Jaswant Sekhon was voted Officer of the Year and honored by the Albany-El Cerrito Exchange Club. The department mourned the passing of retired officer George Schutte, 66. George served for over 18 years (four with Berkeley PD and 14 with BART PD) before receiving a disability retirement in 1987.

BERKELEY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Sergeants Rico Rolleri and David Frankel were promoted to lieutenant and assigned to Patrol. Craig Lindenau was promoted to sergeant and assigned to Patrol. Capt. Bobby Miller retired after 40 years of service. Lt. Dwayne Williams retired after 32 years of service. Marty Magee retired after 28 years of service. Christopher Loverro took a disability retirement after ten years of service.

CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL

DUBLIN AREA: Lt. Sam Samra transferred to the Modesto Area and Lt. Lorraine Krolosky was promoted into the Dublin Area as his replacement. Longtime Court Officer Joaquin Garcia transferred to the Golden Gate Division Commercial Unit as a Mobile Road Enforcement Officer. George Granada was selected as the new Court Officer. Eric Gatty was selected as the new Felony Follow-up Investigating Officer. John Hill transferred to the South Sacramento Area. The following officers were assigned to the Dublin Area from the Academy: Michael Barlow, Miguel Andrade, Jose Mendez, Alan Wong, Daniel Ford, and Rob Estes.

HAYWARD AREA: Transferring out: Sgt. Bryan Yops (Marin), James Burch (Redwood City), Kevin Fitzgerald (Marin), and Justin Morejohn (Napa). Transferring in: Jeramie J. Hernandez, David Harper, Jorge Roesler, John P. Fernandez, Jr., and Jonathan B. Nelson. Anthony Dominguez was promoted to sergeant and transferred to the Hayward Area from Sacramento.
EAST BAY REGIONAL PARKS POLICE DEPT.
Mark Ruppenthal, former EBRPD officer, was appointed to the position of captain after serving as chief of Moraga PD. Ryan Lehew, also a former EBRPD officer, returned to EBRPD from Pleasanton PD. Alan Love was appointed to sergeant, and Margaret Freitag was promoted to dispatch supervisor. The following officers have retired: Capt. Matt Madison (29 years) and Alfredo Anaya (15 years). Newly-appointed officers: Barret Lindsey, Giulia Colbacchini, Daniel Thomas, Nicholas Ramirez, Giorgio Chevez, Megan Reinke, and Timothy Raymond. Wendy Felber was appointed to the position of dispatcher/community service officer.

EMERYVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT
The Emeryville Police Department would like to dedicate this space to their fallen comrades of the Oakland Police Department. EPD has enjoyed a strong relationship with OPD for decades. In April of 1968, EPD fought alongside OPD in an epic gun battle on 28th Street. When EPD Chief (and former OPD officer) Joseph Coletti passed away, OPD patrolled our streets so we could attend his funeral. And, on the tragic day of March 21, 2009, we sent our officers deep into Oakland to assist our brothers and sisters in finding a killer. Our two agencies have stood together side by side and back to back many times with even more similar stories. We will continue to stand with our neighbor to the south and aid anyway we can during their loss.

We would also like to thank the Southern California agencies that met at our PAB to join us in the funeral procession. They include the Orange County Sheriff’s Department, Fullerton PD, Huntington Beach PD, Costa Mesa PD, Ontario PD, Newport Beach PD, Corona PD, and California POST. You all made us proud with your professionalism. Thank you.

FREMONT POLICE DEPARTMENT
Sgt. Dean Cobet retired after 29 years of service.

OAKLAND HOUSING AUTHORITY POLICE DEPT.
New officer: Freddy Villarreal. New reserve officers: Fabian Velazquez and Hazam Beyene. Melaine Gilbert was promoted to Police Service Aide III. Camilya Robinson and Isura Karuaratne were promoted to Police Service Aide II.

OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT
The following officers were promoted to sergeant: John Encinas, Daniel Ming, and Inez Ramirez. Robert Valladon retired after 30 years of service. Lateral appointments: Justin-Paul Bugarin and William Kasiske. Kaizer Albino died on March 7, 2009 after a brief illness. He was 52 years old. Before joining OPD, Kaizer was a sergeant with the Oakland Unified School District PD.

NEWARK POLICE DEPARTMENT
Transfers: Grant Clark from Traffic to Patrol, and Pat Williams from Patrol to Traffic. Brian Pegg left the department on a disability retirement after 12 years of service. Karl Fredstrom was named Officer of the Year. Det. Dan Anderson received the CPOA Award of Law Enforcement Professional Achievement for his investigative expertise, specifically in the area of fraud and identity theft.

PLEASANTON POLICE DEPARTMENT

SAN LEANDRO POLICE DEPARTMENT
Sgt. Jeff Tudor was promoted to interim lieutenant. Robert Sanchez was promoted to sergeant. Brian Anthony was promoted to acting sergeant. Denise Lenz was promoted to Support Services Manager. Sgt. Doug Calcagno transferred to the Criminal Investigation Division. Jason Kritikos graduated from the academy.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA (BERKELEY) POLICE DEPARTMENT
Allen Rollins Sr. died of cancer on April 11, 2009. Before joining the department in 1992, Al was an officer with the Richmond PD. Transfers: Sgt. Karen Alberts from Investigations to Patrol, Sgt. David Roby from Patrol to Housing Liaison, and Sgt. Eric Tejada from Housing Liaison to Investigations. George Hallett was selected as Assistant EOD Technician. Dennis Traille was appointed Property and Evidence Technician.
War Stories

The dangers of secondhand smoking

One morning, a 16-year old boy decided to rob a convenience store near his home in San Leandro. So he armed himself with a toy handgun, walked into the store and told the clerk, “Give me all your money.” It was apparent to the clerk that the gun was plastic, so he said “Get outta here,” and the kid ran. The clerk then called San Leandro PD and gave the dispatcher the robber’s phone number.

How did he know the number? Well, the boy had been in the store a few days earlier with a note from his mother that said, “Please allow my son to buy one pack of Newport shorts. If there’s any problem, call me at [phone number].” The clerk had kept the note and, thus, an arrest was made within minutes.

Another robbery fizzles

In New Orleans, a juvenile walked into a Circle-K store, put a $20 bill on the counter and asked for change. When the clerk opened the cash register, the boy pulled a gun, grabbed all the money, and fled. But he forgot to take his $20 bill. And because there was only $15 in the till (it was a slow day), he suffered a net loss of $5. According to the local newspaper, the officer who took the report wasn’t sure how to classify the crime. “Is it a robbery,” he wondered, “if the suspect points a gun at the victim and then gives him money?”

A twist on Weekend at Bernie’s

In New York City, two men wheeled an elderly man in a wheelchair into a bank and asked the teller to cash his Social Security check. The teller recognized the man as a regular customer and she was about to hand over the money when she realized something: the man was dead. The two men were arrested for attempted theft but prosecutors wouldn’t charge them because they couldn’t prove the men knew their friend had died before they entered the bank. An NYPD detective was critical of the decision, saying, “They didn’t know? He was stiff! He’d probably been dead a week!”

Not guilty of narcissism

A CHP sergeant in Dublin was interviewing a juvenile who was a suspect in a hit and run. The juvenile confessed, then lamented, “I’m always doing the wrong thing.” The sergeant responded, “Well, at least you’re not a narcissist.” The juvenile looked startled and then protested, “I didn’t start any fires!”

Can’t help flashing

A man who had been charged with indecent exposure was being interviewed by a probation officer at the Santa Rita jail when he jumped up, pulled down his pants, and yelled, “Hey, look at this!”

Another kind of flasher

After running a stop sign in Los Angeles, Luis Margarejo led LAPD officers on a chase. Although the officers knew that Luis was a proud member of the Highland Park street gang, they were surprised when he started flashing his gang sign to them, and to pedestrians, and to other motorists. As one of the officers testified, “He flashed the sign at almost every single car that he passed.” Luis was eventually arrested and convicted, and he was given a state prison enhancement for engaging in a pursuit for a gang-related purpose.

On appeal, his attorney argued that the pursuit was not gang-related, but the Court of Appeal disagreed. In a published opinion, the court said, “It is remarkable for a person in a high speed chase to make gang signs to pedestrians and to the police. Marjarejo was serving the criminal purposes of the Highland Park gang by turning his flight into a public display of taunting defiance.”

Higher education in Oakland

A new college has sprouted up in downtown Oakland. It’s called Oaksterdam University, and its mission is to prepare students for careers in the ever-growing fields of medical marijuana production and marketing. The dean says the classes are so popular that he has just added a graduate seminar.
Hip but clueless

A lawyer for a convicted murderer in Miami faxed a motion to the DA which started out, “Dig dis . . . .” He then claimed that a case favorable to the prosecution “wuz rejected by de Flo’ida Supreme Court, Man!” The DA tipped off the judge who appointed a new attorney.

Thinking big

A man named Charles Fuller was arrested for forgery at a bank in Forth Worth when he tried to cash a check for $360 billion dollars. The bank manager said the teller was “kinda suspicious” when she saw all those zeros, to wit: “$360,000,000,000.”

Good hitmen are hard to find

In Michigan, a woman pleaded guilty to placing an ad on Craigslist in which she sought a hitman to murder her boyfriend’s wife.

An officer’s revenge

One day before a police officer in Middletown, New Jersey retired, he wrote fix-it tickets for each of the town’s 14 patrol cars. He said they were unsafe.

Busted, but mighty happy

A man robbed a Bank of America branch in downtown Oakland and put the money—including the bait money—down the front of his pants. As he left the bank, a concealed packet of red dye burst open. Naturally, he looked down and, when he saw his pants covered in red he figured that a bank guard must have shot off his manhood. So he jumped in his car and raced to Highland Hospital’s emergency department. Although he was arrested after doctors figured out what had happened, the arresting officer said that, all things considered, he appeared to be quite relieved.

The Colonel would have been proud

A man walked into a Kentucky Fried Chicken outlet in Berkeley and told the clerk, “I’ll have the all-white three piece dinner meal with mashed potatoes and cornbread, please. Oh, and one more thing—this is a holdup! Give me all your money.” The clerk replied, “All right, sir, but how do you want your chicken? Original or extra crispy?”

If you can’t trust a prostitute . . .

A man in San Leandro wanted to party, so he drove over to Oakland where he bought some cocaine from a street dealer, and then picked up a hooker who was working the same street corner. An Oakland officer happened to be watching the corner and he saw the whole thing. So he stopped the man and said “I’ve got two pieces of news for you. First, that lovely hooker is actually a man. Second, the dude who sold you the cocaine only sells bunk.” The man thought for a second and then said, “Well, I guess you can’t trust anybody these days.” The officer responded, “Yeah, times have changed. It makes you wonder whatever happened to all those trustworthy prostitutes and drug dealers.”